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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE DRONE REGULATION START?
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The proliferation of small unmanned aircraft systems
(microdrones) invites reconsideration of the limits of exclusive
federal authority over aviation, which currently preempts state
law. Public reaction to the drone phenomenon is generally
adverse, putting pressure on state and local legislators to regulate
drones. Many of them have enacted or are considering legislation
and ordinances to do so.
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Many of the state and local initiatives are poorly thought out
and fail to recognize that microdrones can be quite safe, relying on
many internal systems that cause the drone to land immediately or
to return to the launching point if something goes wrong. Most of
the initiatives ignore federal preemption.
In regulating drones, the challenge is how to strike the right
balance between allowing lawless operation and inhibiting the
deployment of a promising new aviation technology.
There is room for state and local action. The number of
microdrones in the air is already overwhelming the FAA’s
enforcement resources. State and local law-enforcement agencies
must be able to reinforce the emerging regulatory regime and to
have clear ground rules for doing so.
State and municipal regulation of commercial operators flying
within and according to the limitations of their FAA granted
authority is preempted.Organized model aircraft activity under
traditional rules of the model aircraft clubs is safe. States and
municipalities should focus their regulatory energies on casual
hobbyists and on commercial operators who are defying FAA
regulations and exemption procedures.
In the long run, a cooperative federal-state regime, modeled on
that used for environmental protection and occupational safety and
health may be desirable.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
You look out your back window and see a small drone
(unmanned aircraft system) hovering a few inches over your lawn,
driving your dog crazy, and watching you watching it. Do you
have to figure out how to report it to the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) and wait for the FAA to send an
inspector, or should you call the cops?
Since the ratification of the United States Constitution—
creating a paradigmatic federal structure for governing the United
States1—new technologies have consistently raised new issues
about the allocation of governing responsibility between the central
government and the sovereign states that ceded some of their
sovereignty to create the United States of America. Steamboats,2
railroads,3 telegraphs and telephones,4 motor cars,5 wireless
communications,6 aircraft,7 nuclear energy,8 the Internet,9 and
1

See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1964) (explaining genesis and
result of federal constitutional convention).
2
See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 99–100 (2000) (reviewing
history of federal preemption of state regulation of steam vessels).
3
See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S.Ct. 1261, 1266 (2012)
(reviewing history of federal preemption of state requirements for railroad
locomotives).
4
See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214,
222 (1998) (reviewing the history of “century-old filed rate” doctrine and
holding that state damages action was preempted).
5
See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–70 (2000)
(explaining federal preemption of state authority to regulate automobile airbags).
6
See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368–70
(1986) (summarizing history of federal preemption of state regulation of wire
and radio communications).
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biotechnology10 each has raised questions anew about whether a
more or less uniform body of national law, or a mosaic of different
state and local laws, would advance social welfare the most.
The proliferation of commercial drones reignites old
controversies over state and federal power. Sold by the thousands
by Amazon and other online vendors,11 and flown by hobbyists and
for commercial purposes in a variety of industries, drones alarm
privacy advocates, enrage anti-government zealots, make pilots
fearful of midair collisions, and invite intervention by politically
ambitious office holders and aspirants. At the same time, drones
excite the entrepreneurial energies of private sector technology
enthusiasts who have applied by the hundreds for governmental
permission to operate them commercially,12 and who forecast
hundreds of thousands of new jobs and billions in economic
growth.13
Drone regulation is inevitable, because like other flying
objects, drones can be dangerous. Airplanes and helicopters are
quite safe statistically, but even they occasionally destroy property

7

See infra Part III.C.
See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984)
(rejecting federal preemption of state punitive damages award involving nuclear
power plant).
9
See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 467 (2005) (noting how Internet
technology provoked clash over state regulation of wine sales; holding that state
prohibition of out-of-state wine sales violated Commerce Clause).
10
See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (reviewing history of
federal preemption of state regulation of drug safety).
11
See Jason Reagan, Drone Sales Figures for 2014 are Hard to Navigate,
DRONE LIFE (Jan. 24, 2015), http://dronelife.com/2015/01/24/drone-salesfigures-2014-hard-navigate/ (analyzing figures for Amazon drone sales).
12
See Section 333, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/
section_333/ (reporting that the FAA has granted 1,891 section 333 exemptions
as of 19 October 2015); Snapshot of the First 500 Commercial UAS Exemptions,
AUVSI, http://auvsilink.org/advocacy/Section333.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2015).
13
See The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the
United States, AUVSI, http://www.auvsi.org/auvsiresources/economicreport
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
8
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and kill people.14 Helicopters and airplanes operate safely most of
the time in a century-old web of customary practices and federal
regulation. The FAA sets standards for the aircraft, the pilots that
fly them, and the procedures of businesses that operate them. That
traditional legal framework is ill-suited to drones. The balance
struck between safety and economic productivity for airplanes
carrying passengers and helicopters performing med-evac missions
cannot merely be extended to much smaller air vehicles with no
one and, usually, no flammable fuel on board. This article focuses
on the allocation of responsibility among different levels of
government, recognizing that much civilian drone activity will take
place close to the ground and within greatly circumscribed
horizontal ranges—matters traditionally regulated by states and
municipalities rather than by the federal government. This article
provides a framework within which an intergovernmental tug of
war among federal aviation regulators, states, and municipalities
can be addressed. The author and his frequent co-author, Eliot O.
Sprague, have been active in exploring sound drone regulation in

14

See Matthew Chambers, Transportation Safety by the Numbers, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/
rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/by_the_numbers/transportation_safety/pdf/enti
re.pdf (comparing aviation safety statistics with motor vehicle accident
statistics) (last visited Sept. 23, 2015).
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other published articles.15 This article is the final in a series of four
articles.16
II.
DRONES
Any regulatory initiatives, whether federal, state, or local,
should proceed from a solid understanding of the technology to be
regulated. Accordingly, this section provides a basic technical
background, explaining benefits and risks of different
technologies, before discussing regulatory approaches.
15

See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17
VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673 (2015); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O.
Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385 (2015);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP Discipline: Training
and Testing Operators of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L. J. 143 (2015); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Seeking Law
Abiding Drones: What to Tell Clients That Want to Use Drones in Their
Business,
BUS.
LAW
TODAY,
Oct.
2014,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/10/01_perritt.html.
These
articles assume, for the most part, that whatever regulation emerges will be
federal and that drone-operator (“DROP”) behavior will be limited by
restrictions imposed by private liability insurers and the prospect of tort liability
for negligent operation. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law
Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385, 439–44, 449–50 (2015).
16
This is the fourth in a series of articles about civilian drones, what the FAA
calls “small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“sUAS”). The first article explores the
subject generally, introducing the important distinction between microdrones
and machodrones and focusing on the engineering choices that are made that
produce actual designs of aircraft in these distinct markets. Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
& Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673 (2015).
The second article focuses more closely on vehicle design and explains that
most of the rules contemplated by the FAA to ensure safe operation can be built
into onboard systems. If drones may be sold only when they internalize aviation
safety rules, the burden of enforcing traditional rules on hundreds of thousands
of operators is eased considerably. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law
Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385 (2015). The third article
focuses on human capital. It proposes that bureaucratic burdens be eased by
delegating much of the responsibility for drone operator (“DROP”) training and
certification to private organizations, extending the model traditionally used for
civilian pilots in the United States. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague,
Developing DROP Discipline: Training and Testing Operators of Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 143 (2015).
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More important, regulatory initiatives should focus on actual,
rather than imagined, risks posed by the technology, quantified as
much as possible. In other words, risk-based regulation should be
the norm. Drone regulation also should impose performance
standards rather than detailed engineering standards,17 which freeze
technology at a particular point in time and discourage innovation.
Finally, the burdens of any particular regulatory approach should
be weighed against the benefit it produces to the public interest.
All regulation necessarily excludes some low-probability risks
with modest costs, when the burden of eliminating them is too
high.18 The FAA has embraced all three of these principles in its
NPRM,19 in its approach to the section 333 process.
A. Drone Classification
Drone technologies are embedded in two distinct groups of
vehicles: microdrones and machodrones.20 The boundary between
the two groups is statutorily defined—anything weighing more
than fifty-five pounds is a machodrone.21 The most popular small
17

See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Albert J. Plawinski, Making Civilian Drones
Safe: Performance Standards, Self-Certification, and Post-Sale Data Collection,
14 NW. J. TECH. & INTEL. PROP. 13–17 (forthcoming Fall 2015) (explaining why
performance standards are better than engineering design standards).
18
See id. at 14–17 (citing sources on risk-based regulation).
19
FAA, Operation and certification of small unmanned aircraft systems, 80
Fed. Reg. 9544, 9552, 9561 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (referring to risk-based
and performance-based approach) [hereinafter “NPRM”].
20
The article ignores altogether toy drones, those costing less than $100,
weighing only an ounce or two, and intended mainly to be flown inside.
21
The range from zero to fifty-five pounds is too large; a five-pound
3Drobotics Solo presents vastly different risks from a fifty-pound aircraft. An
appropriate boundary between small microdrones and big ones—which might be
called “mididrones” has not been defined, however. Maybe it should be the 3
kilogram/4.3 pounds that the UAS America Fund proposed for a special
regulatory category known as micro sUAS. Petition of UAS America Fund,
LLC (“UAS Fund”) to Adopt 14 C.F.R. Part 107 to Implement Operational
Requirements
for
Micro
Unmanned
Aircraft
Systems,
http://www.uasamericafund.com/assets/uas-america-fund-petition-rulemaking.pdf
(filed Dec. 18, 2014). In the NPRM, the FAA explicitly invited comment on this
proposal. NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9556–57 (inviting comment on micro-sUAS
idea). Maybe it should be eight pounds or twenty pounds.

DEC. 2015]

Preemption of State Drone Regulation

315

drones fall at the low end of this range, including the various DJI
Phantom models22 and the DJI Inspire 1, all of which weigh less
than eight pounds. The DJI Spreading Wings S800, S900 and
S1000, the FreeFly Cinestar 8, and many others are a little heavier,
ranging from ten to twenty-five pounds with their payloads of
more sophisticated cameras and gimbals.23 DJI Phantoms account
for more than fifty percent of the first 500 exemptions.24
To facilitate navigation, virtually all drones have electronic
magnetic compasses (magnetometers), altimeters, and GPS
navigation.25 Most drones have autonomous safety features, usually
including automatic take off, landing, and hover; automatic return
to home at the command of the drone operator (“DROP”) or if the
control link is interrupted; and geo-fencing, which keeps the drone
within a certain distance of the DROP, below a certain altitude,
22

About DJI, DJI TECHNOLOGY, http://www.dji.com/company (last visited
Sept. 23, 2015). See Snapshot of the First 500 Commercial UAS Exemptions,
AUVSI, http://auvsilink.org/advocacy/Section333.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2015).
23
The most popular microdrone is the DJI Phantom, which comes in various
models with prices clustered around $1,000. Options include a built-in gimbaled
camera or a gimbal for a GoPro camera. The DJI Phantom,
http://www.dji.com/product/phantom, is a quadcopter, with a diagonal size of 14
inches. It has a maximum gross weight of 2.6 pounds. A close competitor is the
3drobotics Solo, http://3drobotics.com/solo-gopro-drone-specs/, also a
quadcopter, with a diagonal size of 23 inches. It has a maximum gross weight of
3.3 pounds. Larger vehicles in the microdrone category include the SJI S1000,
http://www.dji.com/product/spreading-wings-s1000/spec, an octocopter, with a
diagonal size of fourty-eight inches and maximum gross weight of twenty-four
pounds,
and
the
similarly
sized
Cinestar
8.
See
http://www.quadrocopter.com/CineStar-8-MK-Heavy-Lift-RTF_p_1156.html
(describing Cinestar 8 HL). All of them have maximum endurance of about 20
minutes and autonomous flight control and navigation features, including
automatic hover, automatic return to home, and the ability to fly among preprogrammed waypoints. The smaller ones carry GoPro-sized cameras on 2- or 3axis gimbals with the ability to downlink video. The larger ones can carry larger
camera packages up to and including the Red camera used by professional
cinematographers, and more sophisticated gimbals.
24
AUVSI, supra note 22.
25
See, e.g., DJI, DJI, http://www.dji.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); 3D
ROBOTICS, http://3drobotics.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
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and excludes it from airports and other controlled airspace.26 Most
of them can autonomously fly a flight plan defined in advance by
entering waypoints, and modifiable in flight.27
Microdrones share many basic characteristics. They are
typically multicopters—quadcopters for the smaller products, and
hexacopters or octocopters for the bigger ones.28 They all have
electrical propulsion systems, powered by batteries driving a motor
on each rotor.29 Sophisticated electronic control systems adjust
vehicle attitude and orientation by varying rotor RPM
differentially, obviating the need for most of the mechanical
complexity on helicopters.30 Most microdrones have endurance
within the fifteen to twenty minute range, and few have endurance
greater than thirty minutes.31 With maximum speeds of about forty
knots, their theoretical range is ten to twenty miles.32 As a practical
matter though, the spread-spectrum wireless technologies used for
their control links limit them to less than a mile.33 Microdrones
26

No FLY Zones, DJI, http://www.dji.com/fly-safe/category-mc (last visited
Sept. 26, 2015).
27
3D Robotics, Mission Planner, 3D ROBOTICS, http://3drobotics.com/kb/
mission-planning/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
28
See All Products, DJI, http://www.dji.com/products (last visited Oct. 15,
2015) (providing overview of product line, ranging from quadcopter Phantom
series to hexacopter Spreading Wings S900 and octocopter Spreading Wings
S1000); Ready to Fly, QUADROCOPTER.COM, http://www.quadrocopter.com/
Ready-To-Fly_c_70.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (summarizing available
models, ranging from quadcopter Blade 350 QX3 RTF to octocopter CineStar-8
Heavy Lift RTF).
29
See Aurelian lordache, TED - Drones, how do they work? The basics
explained, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d250ixtyew (demonstrating and explaining basic microdrone subsystems).
30
DJI, supra note 28.
31
3D Robotics, Solo Specs: Just the Facts, 3D ROBOTICS (May 4, 2015),
http://3drobotics.com/solo-gopro-drone-specs/.
32
DJI, Inspire 1, http://www.dji.com/product/inspire-1/spec (last visited Oct.
15, 2015) (specifying maximum speed as twenty-two meters-per-second, or
fourty-three knots). A speed of forty-three knots, multiplied by a flight time of
0.5 hour, results in range of 21.5 miles.
33
See DJI, Phantom 3 Professional, WIKI.DJI, http://wiki.dji.com/en/
index.php/Phantom_3_Professional (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
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have enough thrust to fly up to several thousand feet above sea
level.34
Only a few machodrones have entered the market.35 Their
design will not crystallize until users gain more experience with
widely varying configurations. Machodrones are, by definition,
heavier, approaching the weight of small airplanes and
helicopters.36 They are more likely to have gasoline, diesel, or
turboshaft propulsion systems to allow greater endurance and
range than is available from the smaller vehicles.37 To justify their
cost, they will have to fly beyond line of sight and at altitudes that
will cause them to intermingle with manned aircraft. It is far from
clear whether their capabilities will justify their higher cost, which
is likely to be comparable to, or to exceed that of airplanes and
helicopters in similar weight classes.
B. Benefits
The explosion of interest in civilian drones is fueled by an
appreciation of their utility. Reporter Charlie Rose’s November,
2013 interview with Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos accelerated public
interest in drones.38 The reasons for the interest are clear.
Microdrones can make aviation support—especially aerial
imagery—available where it previously was impractical due to cost
or risk of using manned aircraft.39 Microdrones have acquisition
34

Id.
See, e.g., AVINC, http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/ (last visited Oct.
17, 2015)
36
See Kaman K-MAX Aerial Truck: Built to Lift, KAMAN,
http://www.kaman.com/files/file/PDFs/Helicopter%20PDFs/KMAXBTLProduc
tCard.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (providing specifications for this particular
model of machodrone).
37
See generally High Altitude Long Endurance UAV, AVINC.COM,
https://www.avinc.com/glossary/high_altitude_long_endurance_uav (last visited
Sept. 26, 2014).
38
Amazon’s Jeff Bezos looks to the future, CBS NEWS,
http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/amazons-jeff-bezos-looks-to-the-future/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015) (video recording of interview).
39
NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (summarizing benefits
of microdrones).
35
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costs two-to-three orders of magnitude less than helicopters and
airplanes.40 Their operating costs are similarly lower, although
crew costs may turn out to be comparable, if DROP compensation
resembles that for pilots—the labor market for DROPs is in its
infancy.
The limited payload capability of the smaller drones means that
they are primarily useful for aerial imaging. Typical applications
include: event photography; aerial photography and videos for
marketing of real estate and boats; aerial inspection of utility
infrastructure, such as pipelines, powerlines, railroads, and bridges;
traffic and breaking news coverage for television; assessment of
damage from natural disasters; motion picture and television
production; and crop inspection for precision agriculture.41
Such applications have provided incentives for more than
2,500 individuals and business entities to apply for permits to
operate commercially.42 More than 1,900 of the applications have
been granted, at the rate of 50 or so per week.43
In the future, drones may be able to deliver packages and
disaster relief supplies. Drone proponents project creation of
100,000 jobs and $82 billion in contributions to economic
growth.44 While this is likely overblown, the potential contribution
to economic growth and employment is undoubtedly substantial.
40

A DJI Phantom 3 Professional with accessories retails for $1259. DJI
Phantom 3 Professional Quadcopter Drone with 4K UHD Video Camera,
AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/DJI-Phantom-Professional-QuadcopterCamera/dp/B00VSITBJO/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1443147126&sr=82&keywords=dji+phantom (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). A light helicopter, such
as the Airbus AS350 retails for about $2 million. AIRCRAFTCOMPARE.COM,
http://www.aircraftcompare.com/helicopter-airplane/Eurocopter-AS350-B3/233
(last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
41
AUVSI, supra note 22.
42
Refers to section 333 exemptions, see infra Part IV.A.
43
Authors calculated this number through observation of new applications
granted each week.
44
Darryl Jenkins & Dr. Bijan Vasigh, The Economic Impact of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Integration in the United States, AUVSI (Mar. 2013),
http://www.auvsi.org/econreport; see also Marcelo Ballvé, The Drones Report:
Market Forecasts For Commercial Applications, Regulatory Process, And
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C. Risks
Because microdrones are lighter than helicopters and airplanes,
the safety risks of using microdrones are lower.45 In the event of a
crash, the kinetic energy to be absorbed is minuscule compared to
that of a traditional manned aircraft crash.46 Drones also do not
carry fuel—thus presenting a de minimis fire risk—and cannot
carry people—removing the risks to aircrews and passengers that
drive so much of traditional aviation regulation.47
Operating a microdrone is not without risk, however. Even a
smaller model such as a Phantom48 can cut someone badly with its
blades, or create a panic if it approaches a crowd. Even small
models can be quite heavy—a Phantom weighs about as much as a
pigeon, and Cinestar 8 weighs about as much as a goose.49 Such a
model could probably cause damage to helicopter bubbles
(windshields) and airplane engines similar to the damage resulting
from a bird collision.50 Microdrones can also distract people
Leading
Players,
BI
INTELLIGENCE
(Feb.
26,
2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/aerial-drones-market-forecasts-regulatorybarriers-and-leading-commercial-applications-2015-1 (forecasting $13 billion in
annual spending by 2024, up from $6 billion in 2014).
45
A DJI Inspire has a gross weight of 6.5 pounds (2935 grams). Inspire 1,
DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/inspire-1/spec (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). An
AS350 helicopter has a gross weight of 5,666 pounds. Eurocopter AS350 B3,
AIRCRAFT COMPARE, http://www.aircraftcompare.com/aircraft-specification/
Eurocopter-AS350-B3/233/spec (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
46
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 673, 713 (2015) (explaining the relationship between weight and
kinetic energy).
47
See supra note 18 and accompanying text (assessing risks posed by
microdrones).
48
See AUVSI, supra note 22
49
See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
50
The resistance to bird strikes is tested extensively before any airplane or
helicopter receives an airworthiness and type certificate. 14 C.F.R. § 33.76
(2007) (bird-strike test requirements). The large LiPo batteries and metal
structural components on microdrones, however, absorb energy differently from
bird bodies, and therefore testing beyond birds is necessary. See C. Fremgen et
al, Modeling and testing of energy absorbing lightweight materials and
structures for automotive applications, 6 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF
ADVANCED MATERIALS 883 (2005), available at http://iopscience.iop.org/article/
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performing potentially dangerous activities such as driving. A
driver seeing a small drone in front of her might be inclined to
swerve and apply the brakes, potentially causing an accident.
Additionally, the autonomous safety features of microdrones
have limitations. The control links and GPS communications
necessary for most of them are unreliable. It is common for a drone
to fly away—a situation in which the drone ignores DROP
commands and ascends beyond desired heights or flies beyond
programmed or commanded distances from the DROP.51
Machodrones create far greater risk than microdrones—a risk
similar to or greater than manned aircraft. Because machodrones
are heavier, they must dissipate more kinetic energy in a crash.
Additionally, machodrones are more likely to carry combustible
fuel. Their occupancy of higher levels of airspace magnifies the
risk of mid-air collisions. The fact that their DROPs are on the
ground makes it more difficult for them to honor the see-and-avoid
principle52 that is the mainstay of traditional flight rules.
D. Regulatory Approaches
Risk-based regulation should be the norm. Drone regulation
should focus on actual, quantified risks posed by the technology,
rather than imagined risks, and should impose performance
standards, rather than detailed engineering standards.53 Engineering
standards freeze technology at a particular point in time and
discourage innovation. Finally, the burdens of any particular
regulatory approach should be weighed against the benefit it
produces to the public interest. All regulation necessarily excludes
10.1016/j.stam.2005.07.007/pdf;jsessionid=88323AD4366831CC573894B3D5C7
E018.c1 (explaining analysis of energy absortion capability of different materials);
Pizhong Qiao, et al, Impact Mechanics and High-Energy Absorbing Materials:
Review (2008), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/engineeringmechanicsfacpub/62/.
51
Perritt & Sprague, Drones, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. at 692 (describing
flyaway).
52
See 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (imposing obligation to see and avoid other
aircraft).
53
See Perritt & Plawinski, supra note 17 (explaining why performance
standards are better than engineering design standards).
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some low-probability risks with modest costs, when the burden of
eliminating them is too high.54 The FAA has embraced all three of
these principles in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).55
The FAA has been studying civilian drones since at least 2007,
when it published a Federal Register notice on drones.56 The notice
described a process for obtaining approval for civilian flight
through special airworthiness certificates. The process was
extremely cumbersome, and mandated data submissions borrowed
irrationally from the requirements for experimental airplanes and
helicopters. Until 2012, the agency relied mostly on its slow
moving advisory committee process to tell it how to proceed.57
In 2012, Congress enacted the 2012 FAA Reauthorization and
Revitalization Act (“2012 Act”),58 which contained several explicit
sections requiring the FAA to move faster and ultimately to
integrate civilian drones into the National Airspace System. The
law requires the FAA to develop a comprehensive plan and a
roadmap;59 propose rules, and then finalize them,60 following an
incremental approach. It encourages the FAA to allow lower risk
drones to be flown commercially while more complex issues
relating to high-risk, heavier drones are being worked out.61 In
section 333, it also authorizes interim procedures that would allow

54

See id. at 6 (citing sources on risk-based regulation).
See supra note 21 and accompanying text (referring to risk-based and
performance-based approach).
56
Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed.
Reg. 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
57
See Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), FAA,
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/ind
ex.cfm/committee/browse/committeeID/1. (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). The most
recent posting of the Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles (UAV) Operations
Working Group (WG) is dated 1991.
58
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11)
[hereinafter “2012 Act”].
59
Id. § 332(a) (1) (comprehensive plan); id. § 332(a)(5) (roadmap).
60
Id. § 332(b).
61
Id.
55
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commercial drone flight in specific cases even before the FAA
develops more general regulations.62
The FAA issued the required comprehensive plan63 and
roadmap in 2013,64 began a section 333 exemption process in late
2014,65 and published a notice of proposed rulemaking for
microdrones and mididrones in early 2015.66 The exemption
process resulted in the grant of more than 1,200 section 333
exemptions by mid-2015.67 Pursuant to the statute,68 the FAA
established six test ranges around the country.69 The ranges were
slow to take off for two reasons: needlessly cumbersome
application and approval requirements were initially imposed for
every drone flight on the test ranges; and the FAA was initially
reluctant to give guidance on the research and demonstration
activities that would be most relevant to its regulatory
development.70 Under considerable congressional pressure, the
62

Id. § 333.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Comprehensive Plan, FAA (Sept. 2013),
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/uas
_comprehensive_plan.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
64
Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National
Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap, FAA (2013), http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/
uas_roadmap_2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
65
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative
_programs/section_333/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2015); see Astraeus Aerial Exemption
Rulemaking,
FAA-2014-0352,
http://www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2014-0352 (Sep. 25, 2014).
66
Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
67
Section
333,
FAA,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/
section_333/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (summarizing number of exemptions
granted).
68
2012 Act, Pub. L. 112-95, § 332(c), 126 Stat. 11 (requiring establishment of
“pilot projects”).
69
Test Sites, FAA, https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/test_sites/
(last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (announcing test sites).
70
Unmanned Aerial Systems: Efforts Made toward Integration into the
National Airspace Continue, but Many Actions Still Required UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
(Dec.
10,
2014),
http://gao.gov/assets/670/667346.pdf; FAA Faces Significant Barriers to Safely
Integrate Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System, Report
Number: AV-2014-061, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (June 26, 2014),
63
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FAA began to allow the test ranges to become more useful in early
2015, by steering drone demonstration and experimentation
activities to the test centers and by articulating more clearly the
data needs for regulatory action.71
The agency also has entered into a handful of cooperative
ventures with industry to facilitate technology development which
would enable broader use of machodrones. In particular, the
measures helped facilitate technologies that would provide
collision avoidance through automated sense-and-avoid systems.72
NASA has undertaken a cooperative research effort to accelerate
this technology development.73
The content of the NPRM and the section 333 exemptions
essentially make non-binding guidelines for model aircraft flight
mandatory for commercial drones. The proposed rules include
weight limits and height restrictions (below five hundred feet).74
The rules also prohibit operation beyond the line of sight of the
operator75 and the exemptions allow flights only over property as to
which an operator has permission.76 The rules mandate avoidance
www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Unmanned%2
0Aircraft%20Systems%5E6-26-14.pdf.
71
See Gerald L. Dillingham, Statement Before House Subcommittee on
Aviation, Unmanned Aerial Systems: Status of Test Sites and International
Developments, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Mar.
24, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669214.pdf (raising questions about
whether test sites are being used effectively).
72
Press Release – FAA-Industry Initiative Will Expand Small UAS Horizons,
FAA
(May
6,
2015),
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/
news_story.cfm?newsId=18756 (announcing Pathfinder project).
73
NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the
National Airspace System, NASA (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.nasa.gov/centers/
armstrong/news/FactSheets/FS-075-DFRC.html.
74
Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9544, 9557 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 21,
43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, and 183) (hereinafter “NPRM”) (summarizing
proposed U.S. rules, compared with those of Canada).
75
NPRM 80 Fed. Reg. at 9544, 9560.
76
FAA Exemption No. 11310, Docket No. FAA-2014-0608 (Colin Hinkle) ¶
27 (limiting commercial drone flight to property with permission for each flight
from the property owner/controller or authorized representative), available at
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of manned aircraft, exclude drone flights from airports and other
controlled airspace, mandate careful pre-flight inspection and
conformity to manufacturer instructions, and specify qualification
requirements for DROPs.77
Some of the proposed rules are controversial. The greatest
controversies involve requirements that DROPs have a new
category of airman license, maintain visual contact as opposed to
video aided (first person view or “FPV”) control, and the exclusion
of night flights and operation from moving vehicles. These
requirements are consistently imposed in the section 333
exemptions.78 The proposed rules eliminate the requirement for a
traditional pilot’s license and substitute a new airman certificate
called “sUAS operator.”79 This certificate can be acquired by
passing a knowledge test tailored to drone operation instead of
manned aircraft flight.80 Based on some comments received on
DROP qualification, the final rule is likely to add an experience
requirement and a flight test to the drone qualification
requirements.81
The higher risks associated with machodrone flight justify the
FAA’s incremental approach. Beyond line of sight operations at
higher altitudes are likely to await the results of research and
development on new technologies for collision avoidance.
International competitiveness adds to the pressure to get an
appropriate regulatory regime in place. For example, Canada has
moved much more quickly than the United States to provide
flexible regulations allowing low risk commercial drone
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/333_authorizations/
media/Colin_Hinkle_11310.pdf.
77
NPRM § 107.11, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9544, 9586–9588 (proposed operating
rules); FAA Exemption No. 11310, Docket No. FAA 2014-0608 (Colin Hinkle)
at 5–9 (imposing operating limitations).
78
See generally Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 Exemptions, FAA,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/333_authorizations/
(last visited Sept 26, 2015).
79
See NPRM 80 Fed. Reg. 9544.
80
Id. at 9567–74 (discussing UAS operator rating).
81
Based on the authors’ analysis of comments filed on the NPRM.
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operations.82 Amazon stresses in Congressional hearings and other
public forums that it had to go overseas to conduct research and do
demonstrations of package delivery by drones.83 Without prompt
FAA action to get rules in place, drone design and manufacture are
likely to move offshore.
General rules proposed in the NPRM are unlikely to be in place
before 2016 or 2017. Increasingly, state and municipal
policymakers ask if they can do the regulatory job themselves. The
answer to that question depends on whether state and local
regulation of this new type of aviation activity is preempted by
federal law.
Meanwhile, hundreds of section 333 exemption holders are
beginning to fly commercially. In addition, hundreds, maybe
thousands, of others are flying drones for pleasure or commercially
in ignorance or defiance of the FAA’s regulatory regime. This is
the most serious public safety threat. The FAA has brought no
enforcement proceedings for illegal commercial flight,84 and its
resources will never permit comprehensive enforcement against
drone outlaws. Supplementing FAA resources with state and local
law-enforcement resources might help, but if legal restrictions are
too far out of line with what is possible and safe, noncompliance
will become an even greater problem, exceeding the enforcement
resources of all levels of government.

82

See NPRM Fed. Reg. at 9544, 9557 (table comparing Canadian microdrone
rules with those proposed in NPRM).
83
Ruth Reader, Amazon Spurns Slow FAA, Reveals It’s Been Testing Drones
Abroad, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 24, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/03/24/
amazon-spurns-slow-faa-as-it-tests-drones-abroad/.
84
John Goglia, FAA Says Commercial Drone Operators Need Exemption. But
Doesn’t Prosecute Those Flying Without One, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2015,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoglia/2015/02/13/faa-says-commercial-droneoperators-need-exemption-but-doesnt-prosecute-those-flying-without-one/
(reporting that FAA policy provides “that legal enforcement action is to be taken
only for ‘a violation that poses a medium or high actual or potential risk to
safety,’ such as ‘when a UAS operation has a medium or high risk of
endangering the operation of another aircraft or endangering persons or property
on the ground.’ ”).
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III.
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United States
Constitution limit the states’ power to regulate drones, but do not
entirely eclipse it. This section explains the Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses of the US Constitution, then analyzes some of
the case law relating to the interplay between federal and state law
of aviation.
A. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause prohibits states from interfering with
interstate commerce, while also limiting the scope of federal
power.85 Because drones operate in interstate commerce, the
federal government may regulate their use under the authority of
the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the clause draws a rough
dividing line between what drone regulatory powers lie within
federal authority and what lie within state authority.
Article One of the United States Constitution gives the
Congress of United States the power “to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states . . . .”86 This
provision, known as the Commerce Clause, grants federal
legislative power and simultaneously limits the states. Under the
“dormant commerce clause” doctrine, the states may not interfere
with interstate commerce.87
The Supreme Court has interpreted interstate commerce
broadly. Interstate commerce encompasses commercial activities
that have effects on interstate commerce, as well as those that

85

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that federal
statute prohibiting possession of firearms near schools exceeded Congressional
power under Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601
(2000) (applying Lopez to find that remedy provisions of Violence Against
Women Act exceeded Congressional power under Commerce Clause).
86
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
87
Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1986)
(explaining dormant commerce clause analysis and holding that state tax on
aviation fuel did not interfere with foreign commerce with Canada).
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directly involve intercourse among the states.88 Therefore, it is
likely that the sale and distribution of even the smallest toy drone
affects interstate commerce, because such products are sold online.
In two recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the United States Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause is limited. In United States v. Morrison,89 the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal statute that provided
a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. In so
doing, the Morrison Court reiterated three categories of activity
that fall within the commerce power: “(1) channels of interstate
commerce, (2) the instrumentalities, . . . persons or things in
interstate commerce . . . (3) those activities . . . that substantially
affect interstate commerce.” 90
Focusing on the third category, activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce,91 the Court noted that federal regulation
of intrastate economic or commercial activity has usually been
held to be within the commerce power.92
Because the violence addressed by the statute was not
commercial in character, however, the Court found it outside the
commerce power.
The Morrison Court relied heavily on United States v. Lopez.93
In Lopez, the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute
criminalizing possession of firearms near schools, because it
exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce clause. In
reviewing the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
88

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding
application of NLRA to local steel production labor relations to be within
federal authority under Commerce Clause because of indirect effects on
interstate commerce). “Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions.” Id. at 36.
89
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
90
Id. at 608–09.
91
Id. at 609.
92
Id. at 612.
93
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Lopez court noted Wickard v. Filburn,94 which held that the
commerce power extended to homegrown wheat because of its
economic effect on the national market for wheat. But neither in
Lopez nor Wickard has the Court “declared that Congress may use
a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities.”95 The Court
concluded that “the proper test requires an analysis of whether the
regulated activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”96
Applying that test, the Lopez court rejected the argument that gun
violence might have an effect on interstate commerce.97
Even though the Morrison and Lopez cases involved
constitutional challenges to statutes, the limitations imposed by the
Court also apply to administrative agency actions. Administrative
agencies have no power not validly delegated to them by statute,98
and that power must be constitutionally granted to Congress in the
first place. A statute purporting to delegate a power the Congress
does not have is a legal nullity. Therefore, if a federal agency
attempts to regulate an activity outside the Congress’s commerce
power, the agency action is unconstitutional, just like a statute
directly regulating the same activity.
94

317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (quoting Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
96
Id. at 559.
97
The Lopez court held:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a
local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had
recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement
that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate
commerce. To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States.
Id. at 567.
98
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001)
(holding that agency must demonstrate that Congress validly delegated power to
it).
95
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Together, Morrison and Lopez suggest that federal power over
drones is limited. For commercial activity that does not fall within
the commerce power, per se, the federal regulator must
demonstrate a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.
Merely because an activity is commercial does not mean that it is
within the commerce power. To be within the commerce power,
local commerce must substantially affect interstate commerce. The
same touchstones for evaluating effects are expressed in the Lopez
and Morrison cases; only the level of scrutiny is different.
Federal restrictions on the kinds of drones that may be sold
would involve interstate commerce; regulation of localized drone
flight at low levels above the ground does not. Localized flight
does not involve commerce that crosses state lines; it usually
involves activity within the scope of no more than a mile. Any
safety hazards are local—to persons or property nearby. Safety
hazards to airliners carrying interstate passengers or freight are
minimal, given the autonomous limitations installed on the
vehicle’s control systems that keep them away from where most
commercial manned aircraft fly.
B. The Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause is the source of the FAA’s authority to
preempt state and municipal drone regulation. The Supremacy
Clause99 nullifies state law that conflicts with federal law. Federal
preemption is of three types: express preemption, conflict
preemption, and field preemption. Express preemption occurs
when Congress expressly forecloses state law in a statute. Implied
preemption consists of two variants: conflict preemption and field
preemption. Conflict preemption occurs when a state law or
regulation directly conflicts with federal law. Finally, field
preemption arises when the pervasiveness of federal regulation
leaves no room for state regulation. Usually a presumption against
preemption operates, but not with respect to aviation safety
regulation:

99

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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[T]he presumption against preemption only arises if Congress legislates
in a field traditionally occupied by the states. In matters of air
transportation, the federal presence is both longstanding and pervasive;
that field is simply not one traditionally reserved to the states. The
Supreme Court has not suggested that the presumption against
preemption should be interposed in that field.100

1.

Express Preemption
Express preemption arises from an explicit statutory statement
that states lack power of the subject matter. Federal law declares
that “[t]he United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of
airspace of the United States.”101 This provision has been
interpreted, however, as addressing sovereignty vis-a-vis other
countries rather than the federal-state relationship.102 In Montalvo
v. Spirit Airlines,103 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found no general express preemption in the Federal
Aviation Act,104 and distinguished express preemption under the
Airline Deregulation Act.105
2.

Implied Preemption
Montalvo explains two types of implied preemption in the
aviation context: conflict preemption and field preemption.
Conflict preemption can exist when a state law conflicts with
federal law, or when “a state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives

100

Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding
that state common-law claims by skycaps for a share of an airline fee for
curbside checking of baggage was preempted by the explicit preemption
language in the Airline Deregulation Act).
101
49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2012).
102
Skysign Intern., Inc. v. City and Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1116
(9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting reservation of sovereignty to the United States to
mean national sovereignty, not to mean preemption of state authority).
103
508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007).
104
Id. at 470.
105
Id. at 474–75 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012)) (“A State . . . may
not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and
effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may
provide air transportation under this subpart.”).
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of Congress in enacting the federal law.”106 In some hypothetical
instances, conflict preemption would be obvious. If the FAA
mandates practice auto-rotations as a part of helicopter training,
and a state prohibits practice auto-rotations because of the high
incidence of accidents associated with such flight training, the
conflict is manifest, and the state provision must yield.
However, conflict preemption can be difficult to distinguish
from field preemption. Suppose, for example, that an FAA
regulation prescribes certain content for passenger briefings on
commercial flights, and a state decides to impose an additional
requirement that the briefing include advice that sitting for long
periods of time can produce deep vein thrombosis. The state
measure is preempted, either because the FAA has occupied the
field of passenger briefing, or because adding to the FAA
mandated briefing subjects conflicts with the scheme for passenger
briefing the FAA envisions.107 In other words, the FAA
prescription of certain content implies that briefer should talk
about nothing else in the briefing.
Field preemption exists when federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field “as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”108 As
Part III.A explains, preemption cannot extend beyond the
Commerce power.
C. Preemption in Aviation Law
In the aviation context, Federal law generally preempts state
law. Some three dozen reported state and federal cases address
federal preemption in the field of aviation safety.109 Some of them
contain sweeping language concluding that the entire field of
aviation safety is off-limits to state and local law. For example,

106

Id. at 470.
See supra Part III.B.2.
108
Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 2007).
109
A Westlaw search on 13 June 2015 with the search terms sy,di(“aviation
safety” & preemp!) yielded 36 cases.
107
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Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,110 involved a state law claim
for damages occasioned by operation of an airline transport in
turbulence.111 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that state regulation of aviation safety is federally
preempted.112 “[W]e find implied federal preemption of the entire
field of aviation safety.”113 In early 2014, the FAA said: “[A] state
law or regulation that prohibits or limits the operation of an
aircraft, sets standards for airworthiness, or establishes pilot
requirements generally would be preempted.”114
State regulation can originate in a statute or in common law.
For example, a state might pass a statute that criminalizes certain
drone-related conduct and imposes fines; or give authority to state
or local administrative agencies to promulgate rules, and impose
civil penalties for their violation. Alternatively, a state’s commonlaw can give individuals a private right of action for certain dronerelated conduct, such as causing injury or damage, or invading
personal privacy property rights. Preemption case law discussed in
this part involves both types of approach.
In In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, New York,115 the
district court, assigned multiple cases involving a Colgan Airways
crash, held that occupation of the field of aviation safety by the
Federal Aviation Act leaves no room for state safety standards.
The court held that “[a]pplying state law standards of care would
interfere with these regulations and potentially subject airlines and
related entities to 50 different standards.”116
Other cases, however, adopt a more nuanced approach,
examining whether the FAA has regulated particular subject
matter, the degree of conflict between federal and state rules on the
subject, and whether the matter regulated by the state involves a
110

181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id.
112
Id. at 365.
113
Id.
114
Fact Sheet – Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FAA (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153.
115
798 F. Supp. 2d 481 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).
116
Id. at 486.
111
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subject within traditional state police powers. This section
continues with a description of the state of the law with respect to
different aspects of aviation.
1.

Aircrew Qualification
A state’s prescription of qualifications for flight personnel is
preempted, because of the FAA’s extensive regulation in the area.
In French v. Pan Am Express, Inc.,117 the First Circuit held that
state regulation of drug tests for pilots was preempted, because it
intruded on the field of pilot qualifications, a matter regulated in
detail by the FAA.118
Similarly, in Ventress v. Japan Airlines,119 the court of appeals
held that state employment claims by a flight engineer were
preempted. The plaintiff’s whistleblower claims would have drawn
the state court into deciding “backdoor challenges to [Japan
Airlines’] safety-related decisions regarding his and Captain
Bicknell’s physical and mental fitness to operate civil aircraft.”120
The court stated that “[p]ermitting indirect challenges to aviation
safety decisions under the guise of state law whistleblower claims
interferes with the agency’s authority to serve as the principal
arbiter of aviation safety.”121 The court distinguished Martin v.
Midwest Express Holdings, Inc.122 by finding that state standards of
care for airplane stairs were not preempted because the Federal
Aviation Requirements (FARs) established no requirements for
airplane stairs.123
The Ventress court was careful to point out, however, that not
all state employment law in the airline employment context is
preempted, only those state claims that “encroach upon,

117

869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id.at 4.
119
747 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2014).
120
Id. at 722.
121
Id.
122
555 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2009). See infra Part III.C.4.
123
Ventress, 747 F.3d at 721.
118
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supplement, or alter the federally occupied field of aviation safety”
and jeopardize national uniformity.124
2.

Passenger Warnings and Liquor Service
The Montalvo125 court held that federal law preempted state
negligence claims for an airline’s failure to warn about the danger
of developing deep vein thrombosis. The court reasoned that a
state-imposed duty to warn would conflict with federal safety
standards for pre-flight passenger briefings, and noted that the
FAA occupies the entire field of aviation safety.126 The court
reviewed the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act and
precedent and found Congressional intent to “make the Federal
Aviation Administration the sole arbiter of air safety.”127 It quoted
Justice Jackson: “Planes do not wander about in the sky like
vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to
federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and
under an intricate system of federal commands.”128
Although the court expressed reluctance to infer preemption
from the mere comprehensiveness of statutory authority unless a
federal agency has exercised the authority to occupy a subfield,129 it
found sufficient exercise of FAA authority to “infer a preemptive
intent to displace all state law on the subject of air safety.”130
Significantly for future drone regulation, the Montalvo court
cited the “uniqueness of the aviation industry,” and went on to note
that air transportation “requires more national coordination than
any other public transportation” and “poses the largest risks.”131
The court reasoned that national regulation is required because air

124

Id. at 722–23.
Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 464.
126
Id. at 468.
127
Id. at 472.
128
Id. at 471–72 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S.
292, 303 (1944) (J. Jackson, concurring)).
129
Id. at 470–71.
130
Id. at 472.
131
Id. at 473.
125
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transportation is a “national operation.”132 As Part IV.A explains,
this is not true of microdrone operations.
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell,133 the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that state liquor regulation was preempted as
applied to airline flights. The Court cited Martin, but took a
broader approach, using language that suggests that all aspects of
aviation safety are preempted—appearing to agree with Abdullah
that the statutory savings clause only preserves state remedies for
violation of federal standard.134 Nevertheless, the alcohol service
on air carrier aircraft is the subject of specific federal aviation
rules, and that with state law, New Mexico was “seeking to impose
additional training requirements on flight attendants and crew
members serving alcoholic beverages on airplanes.”135 The court
also noted the FAA’s detailed balancing of various considerations
arising from alcohol service on flights.136 So whether the Tenth
Circuit would follow Martin or Abdullah is unclear. The court
backed away from, but did not overrule Cleveland, noting that its
132

See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007). The
court held:
[i]f the FAA did not impliedly preempt state requirements for
passenger warnings, each state would be free to require any
announcement it wished on all planes arriving in, or departing from, its
soil, or to impose liability for the violation of any jury's determination
that a standard the jury deems reasonable has been violated. Such a
patchwork of state laws in this airspace . . . would create a crazy-quilt
effect. Congress could not reasonably have intended an airline on a
Providence-to-Baltimore-to-Miami run to be subject to certain
requirements in, for example Maryland, but not in Rhode Island or in
Florida. It is equally as doubtful that Congress would have intended the
sufficiency of the Airlines’ warnings to hinge on where each passenger
on each flight was likely to file suit. As the district court noted, such a
result would be an anathema to the FAA.
Id. at 473 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court distinguished
Skysign Int’l Inc. v. City and Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002), on
the grounds that the FAA had not exercised its authority to regulate aerial
advertising. Id. at 473.
133
627 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2010).
134
Id. at 1327–29.
135
Id. at 1328.
136
Id.
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reasoning has been called into question by subsequent Supreme
Court cases.137 The court remanded, however, a claim for unsafe
seating configurations, which required closer analysis of airlinefare preemption.138
3.

Flight Rules: Aerial Advertising
Federal law might not preempt state law on aerial advertising.
Regulation of what aircraft may do in flight would seem to be at
the heart of detailed FAA regulation. For example, parts 71, 91, 97,
119, 135, and 136 of the FARs contain hundreds of pages of
specific operating rules. The regulations do not, however, cover
everything relating to aircraft.
In Skysign International, Inc. v. City and County of
Honolulu,139 the Ninth Circuit held that local regulation of signage
could be applied to banner-towing aircraft, notwithstanding broad
federal preemption of aviation safety.140 The plaintiff’s helicopters
operated under certificates of waiver (“COWAs”) issued by the
FAA.141
Because advertising is an activity traditionally regulated by the
states rather than by the federal government, the court presumed
“that federal law does not displace Honolulu’s regulatory authority
over advertising absent a clear statement of the federal intent to do
so, either by Congress or by the FAA as Congress’s delegate.”142
The court found that Honolulu’s general signage ordinance was
entitled to this presumption, but not a companion ordinance that
singled out aviation by prohibiting any advertising on an aircraft.143
Further, the court found that Congress has expressly preempted
state regulation of aircraft noise and airline pricing, but not state
regulation of aerial advertising.144 Although not mentioned by the
137

Id. at 1326.
Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 475 (9th Cir. 2007).
139
276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002).
140
Id. at 1117–18.
141
Id. at 1113.
142
Id. at 1115.
143
Id. at 1116.
144
Id.
138
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court, based on the nature of the advertisement, the plaintiff’s
aircraft would not leave the state. If the aircraft traveled between
states while carrying an advertisement, the outcome might have
been different.
The court was unwilling to infer field preemption from the
“mere volume and complexity” of federal aviation regulation145 in
the absence of any explicit federal regulation on the subject a state
seeks to regulate. It rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
preemption should be inferred from FAA silence on a subject.146
Significantly, it was equally unwilling to infer preemption from
overlapping safety concerns.147 The Court was unwilling to read a
provision directing the FAA Administrator to “prescribe air traffic
regulations in the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe
altitudes) for . . . protecting individuals and property on the
ground.”148 The Court did not interpret this provision to “preclude
local regulation with an identical purpose that does not actually
reach into the forbidden, exclusively federal areas, such as flight
paths, hours, or altitudes.”149 Therefore, by negative implication, a
local ordinance that did address flight paths, hours, or altitudes
would be preempted. Finally, the FAA COWAs150 did not give rise
to preemption, because they expressly required that the operator
“understand” local laws relating to aerial signs.151
4.

Aircraft Design
State regulation prescribing flight rules or aircraft design is
preempted, despite personal injury cases arising from aircraft
accidents involving questions of adequate design. The FAA
145

Id.
Id. at 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2002).
147
See id. at 1117 (“Skysign notes that Honolulu justifies its ordinance based
in part on the danger that distracting aerial advertising poses to motorists below,
and it attempts to argue that Congress has confided to the FAA exclusive
authority over such safety concerns.”).
148
49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2)(B) (2012).
149
Skysign, 276 F.3d at 1109.
150
14 C.F.R. § 91.311 (2015) (providing that banner-towing airplanes or
helicopter require a certificate of waiver (“COWA”) issued by the FAA).
151
276 F.3d at 1117–18.
146

338

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 307

imposes detailed standards for aircraft design. The accommodation
of federal and state standards in such cases is manifest, more than
in cases involving aircrew qualifications and operating rules.
Damages for personal injuries can co-exist with federal aviation
safety regulations, however, as the cases discussed in this section
show.
In Lewis v. Lycoming,152 the district court interpreted Abdullah
and Elassaad to hold that state products liability claims are not
preempted on field preemption grounds.153 Instead, the court held
that a successful preemption defense requires establishing conflict
between federal and state standards, or at least federal regulation of
a particular aspect of safety.154
Many cases finding no preemption involve products liability
actions premised on claims of negligent design, for example,
Public Health Trust of Dade County, Fla. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc.155
In Lake Aircraft, the plaintiff was injured in a seaplane accident
and claimed that his seat was negligently designed. The Eleventh
Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendant, finding that,
despite FAA standards for seat design, allowing a damages action
to proceed did not interfere with federal regulation.156
FAA regulation of aircraft design and manufacture is even
more detailed than regulation of aircrew qualification. Preemption
in this field of aviation safety is not complete, however. Cleveland
By and Through Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,157 is an
influential case illustrating this point.158 In Cleveland the court of
appeals found that aircraft manufacturers could comply with FAA
“minimum” safety standards and also comply with standards of
care embodied in state tort law.159
152

957 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
Id. at 558–59.
154
Id.
155
992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993).
156
Id. at 294.
157
985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993).
158
Id. at 1444.
159
Id. at 1445.
153

DEC. 2015]

Preemption of State Drone Regulation

339

Cleveland involved a claim by the pilot160 that his severe
injuries in a crash were due to the negligent design of the aircraft.
The jury found that Piper had negligently designed the aircraft by
providing for inadequate visibility from the rear seat (from which
the pilot was flying) and failing to provide a rear shoulder
harness.161 Furthermore, the court held that FAA approval of an
aircraft’s design “is not intended to be the last word on safety.”162
The court observed that the FAA has given manufacturers broad
responsibilities for assuring their own compliance by appointing
aircraft company employees to “act as surrogates of the FAA in
examining, inspecting, and testing aircraft for purposes of
certification.”163 There was, thus, no conflict preemption. As noted
in the discussion of O’Donnell above,, subsequent Tenth Circuit
case law raises questions as to the viability of the Cleveland
analysis.
When FAA regulations are silent on the design of a particular
subsystem, there may be room for state law. The Martin court
interpreted Montalvo to mean that when the agency issues
“pervasive regulations” in an area, like passenger warnings, the
FAA preempts all state law claims in that area.164 In areas without
pervasive regulations or other grounds for preemption, the state
standard of care remains applicable.”165 The court rejected the
proposition that the aircraft certification process preempts every
state inquiry into aircraft design; the process only preempts those
design or performance matters that are explicitly addressed by
specific certification regulations.166 The court observed that
airstairs were not “pervasively regulated,” and as such it was “hard
to imagine that any and all state tort claims involving airplane

160

The pilot was flying a Piper Super Cub PA–18–150. Id.
Id. at 1441.
162
Id. at 1445.
163
Id. at 1445.
164
Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 809–10 (9th Cir.
2009).
165
Id. at 811.
166
Id. at 811–12.
161
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steps are preempted by federal law.”167 The Martin court found
support for its approach in Cleveland,168 and acknowledged that the
Third Circuit takes a different approach. The Third Circuit decided
that “federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the
field of air safety” and thus generally “preempts the entire field
from state and territorial regulation.”169
Later, in Gilstrap v. United Airlines, Inc.,170 the Ninth Circuit
embraced both Martin and Abdullah, adopting “Abdullah’s
division of the FAA’s field preemptive effect into two
components: state standards of care, which may be field-preempted
by pervasive regulations, and state remedies, which may survive
even if the standard of care is so preempted.”171 The court’s use of
the words may and even if, however, still allows for Martin’s
conclusion that preemption results only when the FAA has
explicitly regulated the particular aspect of safety involved in the
state lawsuit.
Unlike airstairs, however, pilot qualifications and medical
standards are subject to detailed FAA regulation.172 Thus the
different result in Ventress, supra.
167

Id. at 812. (“Airstairs are not pervasively regulated; the only regulation on
airstairs is that they can’t be designed in a way that might block the emergency
exits. The regulations have nothing to say about handrails, or even stairs at all,
except in emergency landings. No federal regulation prohibits airstairs that are
prone to ice over, or that tend to collapse under passengers’ weight. The
regulations say nothing about maintaining the stairs free of slippery substances,
or fixing loose steps before passengers catch their heels and trip. It’s hard to
imagine that any and all state tort claims involving airplane stairs are preempted
by federal law. Because the agency has not comprehensively regulated airstairs,
the FAA has not preempted state law claims that the stairs are defective.”)
(internal citations omitted).
168
Id. at 811 (citing Abdullah, 181 F.3d 363, 367) (to find FAA preemption of
a failure to warn claim, but applying a state law analysis to a claim that a
navigational instrument was defectively manufactured).
169
Id. at 809 (quoting Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367) (internal quotations
omitted).
170
709 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2013).
171
Id. at 1006 (emphasis added).
172
Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 721–22 (9th Cir. 2014).
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5.

Airport Location
The boundary between state and federal authority gets murkier
when states determine where airports can be located and what
operations can occur to and from them. In this regulatory arena,
aviation safety and traditional state control of real property and its
uses overlap. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.173 is
the leading Supreme Court case on preemption of airport
regulation. In City of Burbank, the Court held that a municipal
noise ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft from taking off overnight
was preempted, despite the fact that the only scheduled flight
affected by the ordinance flew intrastate.174
In its 5-4 decision, the Court focused its attention almost
entirely on federal regulation of aircraft noise rather than on
general aviation safety regulation.175 It emphasized, however, the
interplay between operational restrictions to reduce noise and other
aspects of aircraft operation. The Federal Aviation Act requires a
“delicate balance between safety and efficiency and the protection
of persons on the ground.”176 The court held that “[a]ny regulations
adopted by the Administrator to control noise pollution must be
consistent with the ‘highest degree of safety.’”177 It also noted that
local restrictions on hours of operation would have a ripple effect
through the national aviation system, and would limit the FAA’s
flexibility in controlling traffic flow.178
Several cases reached the opposite outcome, however. For
example, in Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus,179 the Sixth Circuit
held that a local ordinance180 prohibiting operation of seaplanes on
173

411 U.S. 624 (1973).
Id. at 625–26 (summarizing facts).
175
Id. at 633–39.
176
Id. at 639.
177
Id. at 638–39.
178
Id. at 639–40.
179
76 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 1996).
180
76 F.3d at 781 (The challenged ordinance provided that “[l]and may not be
used for any of the following purposes, all of which are declared to be public
nuisances: E. The mooring, docking, launching, storage, or use of any . . .
aircraft powered by internal combustion engines . . . . J. The landing upon the
174
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a city-owned lake was not preempted. The court distinguished
regulation of aircraft in flight from regulation of aircraft landing
sites, “which involves local control of land (or, in the present case,
water) use.”181 It also distinguished City of Burbank, which held
that a local noise ordinance was preempted because it interfered
with airport operations. Aircraft noise, the Gustafson court said, is
the subject of several explicit pronouncements by the FAA, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in the legislation
history of the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control that
embraced federal preemption.182 The Gustafson court also
distinguished Command Helicopters, Inc. v. City of Chicago,183
finding local regulation of helicopter heavy lift operations
preempted because it conflicted with FAA regulations on heavy lift
operations.184 It also found in 14 C.F.R. § 157.7(a), the federal
airport siting regulation, an express savings clause for local zoning
and other land use regulation,185 and—citing a number of earlier

lands, waters, or ice surface within the Village of Lake Angelus of any aircraft,
airplane, sailplane, seaplane, helicopter, ground effect vehicle, or lighter than air
craft.”) (internal quotations omitted). The city council declared that the
ordinances were intended to “protect the public health, safety, and general
welfare” of the residents, by preventing “noise, danger, apprehension of danger,
pollution, apprehension of pollution, contamination and infestation from other
bodies of water, destruction of property values, and interference with other
lawful uses of the lake enjoyed by the great majority of citizens, including
boating, sailing, fishing, swimming, and other recreational uses.” Id.
181
76 F.3d at 783.
182
“In contrast, in the present case, an examination of the Federal Aviation
Act and regulations concerning seaplanes and aircraft landing sites indicates that
the designation of plane landing sites is not pervasively regulated by federal law,
but instead is a matter left primarily to local control. In contrast to the pervasive
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise found in Burbank, we fail to
identify any language in the Act, the regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Act, or the legislative history of the Act, which by implication preempts
enforcement of the City’s ordinances prohibiting the operation of seaplanes on
Lake Angelus.” Id. at 784.
183
691 F.Supp. 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
184
76 F.3d at 787–88.
185
Id. at 784–85.
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case—found that local airport siting regulation was not
preempted.186
Similarly, in Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul,187 the Eighth
Circuit held that the denial of a permit for a heliport did not intrude
upon exclusive federal power.188 The court found “no conflict
between a city’s regulatory power over land use, and the federal
regulation of airspace, and have found no case recognizing a
conflict.”189 In Golden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay,190 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that an ordinance prohibiting the creation of
private heliports was not preempted. It distinguished heliport siting
from matters that require national uniformity.191
In Riggs v. Burson,192 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a
state statute prohibiting heliports within nine miles of the boundary
of national park was not preempted. The plaintiffs argued that the
statute was aimed at flight of aircraft and aircraft noise; the
defendants argued that it was aimed at the use of land and not the
flight of aircraft.193 In agreeing with the defendants, the court cited
Gustafson, distinguished Burbank, and found Condor Corp.
persuasive.194 The legislature articulated legitimate state interests:
regulation of “noise, disruption and safety risks caused by locating
heliports near main roads and heavily populated areas.”195 The
186

Id. at 786.
912 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1990).
188
Id. at 223.
189
Id. 219.
190
390 A.2d 1177 (N.J. 1978).
191
Id. at 1181. “The case at hand does not present a situation where
preemption may be predicated upon a felt need for a monolithic system of
regulation. While in some important aspects uniform regulation may be
required, that obvious need does not reach down to the level of the location of
small, relatively isolated, privately owned helistops or heliports.” Id. The court
cited cases supporting its conclusion that “state and local authority over the
“operation and navigation of aircraft is supplanted by this federal regulation, . . .
significant local power over ground operations of aircraft remains viable.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
192
941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1997).
193
Id. at 48 (summarizing arguments).
194
Id. at 48–51.
195
Id. at 50.
187
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court stated, “[W]e agree with the persuasive federal and state
authority that has upheld laws which restrict the use of land for the
operation of helicopters or other aircraft.”196
In Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club, Inc.,197 the district court
distinguished Gustafson and held that a private suit to enjoin
operations on one runway of an existing airport was preempted.
The litigation did not involve regulation of land use by a public
body. Indeed, the airport was approved under state law.198
In Harrison v. Schwartz, however,199 Maryland’s highest court
held that certain zoning restrictions imposed on airport operations
were preempted and others were not. It held that conditions in the
conditional use permit dictating aircraft takeoff separation times,200
and night-time takeoff times201 were preempted. The court went on
to distinguish the use of local zoning power to ban a certain use
from permitting a use subject to conditions that “affect air
navigation.”202

196

Id. at 51.
96 F. Supp. 2d 820 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
198
Id. at 823–24. “In Gustafson, the issue surrounded a city ordinance which
prohibited the landing or taking-off of airplanes on a city lake—not an airport or
runway. In the present case, plaintiff is seeking to enjoin an airport from using
its already zoned runway—a runway which is protected by a state statute. See
620 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/49.1 (prohibiting plaintiff from erecting any structure
which would interfere with airport operations). Significantly, the plaintiff does
not contend that the airport’s operation violates any ordinance or regulation. In
sum, although plaintiff claims that he is seeking to regulate land use, what he is
actually seeking to regulate is the use of the airspace above his property. Thus,
plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the FAA.” Id.
199
572 A.2d 528 (Md. 1990).
200
“Aircraft take-offs shall be separated by intervals of at least 15 minutes in
order to minimize the adverse effects of aircraft engine noise upon the residents
of the surrounding area and to reduce the intensification of the use of the
property in what is otherwise a primarily rural residential area.” Id. at 529.
201
“Aircraft take-offs shall not be made before 9:00 a.m. or later than 7:00
p.m. on any day.” Id. (quoting conditions).
202
Id. at 533.
197
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6.

Environmental Regulation of Airport Activities
Environmental regulation, especially when it is of a general
nature rather than targeting specific airports or aviation operations,
is likely to fall within state police power. A number of preemption
cases involve environmental regulation by states and
municipalities.
In Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. East Haven,203 the
district court enjoined local environmental authorities from
interfering with construction of federally approved and funded
runway improvements. The court held that the local governmental
regulation was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act under the
doctrine of field preemption.204 It distinguished Dallas/Fort Worth
Int’l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving,205 as involving land outside
airport boundaries.206 It cited Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena v. City
of Los Angeles, in which the City of Los Angeles enacted an
ordinance requiring a local airport to submit for approval any plans
that involved development—specifically runway and taxiway
construction—on airport-owned land.207
In United States v. City of Berkeley,208 a case relied on by the
Authority in Tweed-New Haven, the court addressed the City’s
attempt to regulate construction of an airport surveillance radar.
According to the FAA, the construction was necessary to ensure
air safety. The Berkeley court held that the City’s attempted
regulation was impliedly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act
because federal regulation of the area is so pervasive. The court
reasoned that non-proprietary versus proprietary is significant.209
When the local government is the proprietor of the airport, it has
broader authority.210 It found preemption despite evidence of local
203

582 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Conn. 2008).
Id. at 272.
205
854 S.W. 2d 161, 167 (Tex. App. 1993).
206
Tweed-New Haven, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
207
979 F.2d 1338, 1339 (9th Cir. 1992).
208
735 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
209
Id. at 941.
210
The proprietary airport doctrine logically extends to any territory that a
state or municipality like a park district owns and already regulates extensively.
204
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concerns about traffic disruption and adverse affects on the quality
of life of local residents because of noise.211
In Goodspeed Airport LLC v. East Haddam Inland Wetlands &
Watercourses Commission,212 the Second Circuit held that local
regulation of tree removal was not preempted. The plaintiff was
privately owned and state-licensed. The airport argued that the
trees were “obstructions to air navigation” under 14 C.F.R. § 77,
and therefore that local limitations on removing them were
preempted.213 The court distinguished Tweed, in that the local
regulatory action at issue in Tweed “constitutes a much more direct
intrusion of local authority on the preempted field of air safety.”214
The court noted that the airport in Tweed was not licensed by the
FAA, was not federally funded, and there was no federal interest in
the airport’s proposed actions.215 The court also noted that the
challenged local regulations did not single out aviation, but rather
they were limitations of general applicability.216 The court also
observed that the FAA exercises only limited direct oversight of
small airports.217
Therefore, matters within the boundary of an airport are more
likely to be preempted than those outside the boundaries, because
activities outside the boundaries are less directly linked to
aviation.218
7.

Private Actions for Trespass to Land
In addition to state and local regulation via statutes, ordinances,
and administrative-agency rules, private actions for trespass to land
also challenge federal authority. The common law of trespass to
land recognizes the overflight close to the ground may be a
211

Tweed-New Haven, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 271 n.13.
634 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2011).
213
Id. at 208.
214
Id. at 211.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. East Haven, 582 F. Supp. 2d 261,
271–72 (D. Conn. 2008)..
212
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trespass: “Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land of
another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into the immediate
reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it interferes
substantially with the other’s use and enjoyment of his land.”219
Early in the history of aviation, the Supreme Court recognized
that extensive liability for trespass would interfere with aviation:
“The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is
part of the public domain. We need not determine at this time what
those precise limits are. Flights over private land are not a taking,
unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.”220
These principles suggest that drone flight over private property
at the heights approved for microdrones under the Section 333
exemptions and proposed in the NPRM could give rise to liability
for trespass to land. While the advent of drones has extended the
concept of air navigation and of the National Airspace System to
levels lower than the traditional 500 feet, and thus extended the
federal interest in regulating it to lower levels,221 the fact remains
that operations that close to the ground intrude upon traditional
property rights. The resulting tension between private interests in
exclusive domain over property and the public interest in air
commerce places greater emphasis on delineating the height to
which property extends—a question which the Restatement on
Torts,222 Hinman,223 and Causby224 do not address. A reasonable
219

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (2015) (discussing United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946)). The Restatement suggests that
“immediate reaches” of the land extend to 50 feet, not to 500 feet and that
heights in-between, such as 150 feet would present questions of fact. Id. cmt. l.
220
Causby, 328 U.S. at 267 (holding that low-level flights by military aircraft
constituted a compensable taking); see also Bryski v. City of Chicago, 499
N.E.2d 162, 164–167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (reviewing caselaw after Causby and
concluding that sole remedy for aircraft noise from municipal airport is action
for reverse condemnation).
221
But see infra Part IV.A (evaluating argument that Commerce Clause and
thus the permissible reach of FAA preemption does not extend below 500 feet).
222
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (2015).
223
Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
224
Causby, 328 U.S. at 267.
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rule of thumb is that a drone flying lower than treetop level or the
level of utility lines commits a trespass, but not if it stays above
that level.225
Some general principles can be established from the case law
discussed above. First, courts have held that the FAA’s extensive
regulation in an area preempts state action in the same area. For
example, regulation of pilots, employment claims by airline
personnel, state liquor regulation, and aircraft design are all
exclusively federal domain. However, some areas of regulation can
coexist, for example, aerial advertising, airport location, and
environmental regulation of a general nature. Second, states are
also free to regulate drone operations when a statute explicitly
saves room for state regulation, as in tort remedies.
D. Interaction of Commerce Clause and Preemption
The Commerce Clause and federal preemption doctrine interact
in determining the legality of state regulation of drones. Under its
commerce power, Congress retains the authority explicitly to
preempt state and local regulation, as it has done with respect to

225

This is the authors’ conclusion, based on the practical ability of a property
owner to control airspace over her property.

DEC. 2015]

Preemption of State Drone Regulation

349

economic regulation of airlines.226 It has explicitly forborne to do
so with respect to state law remedies.227
As to the more general realm of aviation safety regulation,
Congress has not spoken explicitly about state power, but it has
granted broad authority to the FAA and specified some details as
to how the FAA should exercise that authority.228 The FAA’s
details are in line with the many judicial findings of implied
preemption.229 Therefore, the FAA could decide to adopt explicit
statutory preemption of state regulation of drones, partially or
completely, within the limits of interstate commerce.
Federal preemption thus turns on a parallel inquiry, with the
FAA as the focus instead of Congress. Although some of the
aviation preemption cases make sweeping pronouncements of field
preemption, closer examination of the cases shows, not field
preemption, but preemption turning on whether the FAA has
exercised its statutory authority with respect to a particular aspect
of safety. The analogy under the Commerce Clause is whether the
Congress has exercised its authority on a particular subject.
As long as it acts within its statutory authority, the FAA could
adopt a new rule that not only regulates some aspect of drone
226

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2012) (“A State, political subdivision of a State, or
political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or
service of an air carrier.”). Compare Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 391 (1992) (state deceptive advertising guidelines preempted as
applied to airline fares), with American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233
(1995) (state breach of contract action for violating terms of frequent flying
program not preempted). “[T]erms and conditions airlines offer and passengers
accept are privately ordered obligations and thus do not amount to a State’s
‘enact[ment] or enforce[ment] of any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law within the meaning of
§ 1305(a)(1).” 513 U.S. at 228. See also 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b) (prohibiting state
taxation air commerce).
227
49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (“A remedy under this part is in addition to any other
remedies provided by law.”). See also 49 U.S.C. § 40116(c) (allowing landing
fees for commercial aircraft landing or taking off within a state).
228
2012 Act § 332 (providing general guidance for FAA drone rules)
229
See supra Part III.B.2.
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operations that theretofore had been unregulated, but it also could
explicitly preempt state regulation. It could do so either as to the
subject of the new FAA rule, or expressing its conclusion that an
aspect of safety should go unregulated. As long as the FAA has
done neither, states have a plausible argument that they are free to
regulate the subject matter. Martin and Montalvo, discussed in Part
IV.A, are examples of this kind of analysis. Having the power to
define the boundary between federal and state regulation, the FAA
or Congress could define a system for cooperative and concurrent
state and federal regulation of drones, as Part VI suggests.
IV.
STATE REGULATION OF DRONES
As Part III concludes, states are free to regulate drone
operations when a statute explicitly saves room for state regulation,
such as in tort remedies, or when the FAA has not exercised its
authority on a particular subject.
Additionally, the FAA’s approach to drone regulation makes
room for some arguments not generally available with respect to
traditional aviation safety regulation. While the FAA’s statutory
mandate is to integrate drones into the National Airspace System,
its approach to microdrone regulation actually segregates
microdrones and keeps them out of the vast expanse of the national
airspace where most manned aircraft operations occur. The
approach relegates microdrones to flights below 500 feet, where
airplanes and helicopters cannot operate safely, and also keeps
them out of airport traffic areas where manned aircraft operate
below 500 feet in order to take off and land. The content of its
proposed rule and its Section 333 exemptions prescribe few
operating rules beyond the height limit and a line of sight
requirement—which is tantamount to a horizontal distance
restriction.
In effect, the FAA has said that microdrones can be operated
commercially, as long as they are outside the national airspace
system. The FAA has not admitted as much; rather, its position,
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obvious from the content of FAR Part 91,230 is that airspace all the
way to the ground is regulated by FAA rules.231 There is no explicit
floor of the national airspace system, however, expressed either in
statute or rule.
A defender of state regulatory authority would argue that the
combination of low altitudes and short distances puts microdrone
flight, at least as the FAA would allow it for commercial purposes,
outside the National Airspace System. Therefore, such operation is
outside the realm of Air Commerce, outside Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, and beyond FAA jurisdiction.
Indeed, the FAA has defined microdrone airspace that is
inherently local and well within traditional state police power. This
argument may prove too expansive, however, because it would
negate FAA authority, and leave it only to the states and their
subdivisions to regulate low-level and close-in drone flights—not
only drone flights, but any flight by any kind of vehicle.
A. Subjects of State Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause
preemption doctrine, states may not regulate matters authorized by
Section 333 exemptions, or any final FAA microdrone rule.232
States may prosecute local offenses, however, and apply their tort
law to traditional sources of liability.233 States may not impose
DROP qualification standards, but can apply general employment

230

14 C.F.R. pt. 91 contains FAA operating rules for aircraft.
“The FAA is responsible for the safety of U.S. airspace from the ground
up.” Busting Myths about the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, FAA (Feb. 26,
2015), http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76240.
232
This conclusion results from the case law analyzed supra Part III.C, which
holds that states may not regulate matters explicitly regulated by the FAA.
233
This conclusion results from the cases analyzed supra Part III.C.7,, which
hold that the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt state law remedies.
231
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law.234 States may not require the registration of drones registered
with the FAA.235
If the argument prevails that the FAA has essentially defined
the floor of the national airspace system as 500 feet,236 states and
localities have plenary authority to regulate low-level drone flight.
If that argument fails, or if plaintiffs with standing are unwilling to
make the argument, the scope of federal and state regulation
depends upon application of the case law, which yields the
following conclusions.
States may not regulate subjects explicitly addressed by the
FAA in its NPRM and Section 333 exemptions—at least not as to
the holders of the exemptions and once the regulation becomes
final. That means that states may not impose different weight
limits, height limits, preflight inspection requirements, accident
reporting requirements, or periodic reporting requirements on
operations. Thus, states may not impose different DROP
qualification, training, certification, or experience requirements.
They may not impose vehicle design requirements.
Under Martin, silence on the part of the FAA is not enough to
preempt.237 Therefore, the FAA had not preempted the field of
drone regulation before it issued its notice of proposed rulemaking
and began granting Section 333 exemptions, because it had not
spoken. Now, however, the FAA has spoken. The Martin argument
would be available only if the FAA unexpectedly does not act
reasonably promptly to turn its NPRM and the comments it
received into final rules. Otherwise, the defender of a state or local
measure would be left only the relatively weak read of the Tenth
Circuit Cleveland decision.238
234

This conclusion results from the cases analyzed supra Part III.C.1, which
holds that states may not prescribe aircrew qualifications but may apply their
general employment law.
235
This conclusion results from the case law analyzed in supra Part III.C,
which holds that states may not regulate matters explicitly regulated by the
FAA.
236
See supra Part III.D.
237
See Martin, supra note 122.
238
See supra Part III.C (analyzing cases).
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Regardless, the holder of a Section 333 exemption would have
a strong argument that the detailed involvement of the FAA in
crafting the exemption preempts state and local regulation of
matters covered by the exemption. On the other hand, states retain
their authority to enforce generally applicable state and local law
against disorderly conduct,239 public endangerment,240 refusal to
obey the lawful command of a police officer,241 and refusal to
disperse.242 The FAA has published guidance for local law
enforcement personnel confronted with what they believe to be
impermissible microdrone operations.243 Recognizing traditional
state power to preserve public order, states should have the power
to establish tort liability or to criminalize reckless conduct,244
239

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 (2013) (disorderly conduct).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-207 (1987) (criminal endangerment).
241
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-1 (2014) (interference with public officers).
242
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57–58 (1999) (affirming
conclusion that gang-dispersal ordinance was unconstitutionally vague;
explaining that laws criminalizing disobedience of police order are similarly
questionable because of the possibility of arbitrary police orders); CA PENAL
CODE §§ 409, 416 (discussing refusal to disperse).
243
See Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Law
Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations,
http://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/FAA_UASPO_LEA_Guidance.pdf.
244
Several states have criminalized reckless endangerment. In Alabama, “A
person commits the crime of reckless endangerment if he recklessly engages in
conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another
person.” ALA. CODE § 13A-6-24 (West 2015).
New York has both a first degree and a second degree reckless endangerment
statute. Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree occurs, “when the person
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical
injury to another person.” N.Y. STAT. 120.20. Reckless Endangerment in the
First Degree occurs, “when, under circumstances evincing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another person.” N.Y. STAT. 120.25.
In Illinois, the law provides:
Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct.
(a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means
lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that:
(1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or
240
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although this also is the subject of an FAA rule prohibiting
reckless flight operations.245
The Section 333 exemptions themselves do not address state
and local regulation. The blanket COAs accompanying the
exemptions however do. On the contrary, a note on the first page
says, “This certificate constitutes a waiver of those Federal rules or
regulations specifically referred to above. It does not constitute a
waiver of any State law or local ordinance.” 246 Further language on
the last page says, “This Certificate of Waiver or Authorization
does not, in itself, waive any Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations,
nor any state law or local ordinance.”247
(2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to
another person.
(b) Sentence.
Reckless conduct under subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
Reckless conduct under subdivision (a)(2) is a Class 4 felony.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/12-5.
Additionally, such conduct has occurred frequently. See, e.g., Brett Snider,
Esq., 2 Drone Pilots Arrested for Allegedly ‘Endangering’ NYPD Helicopter,
FINDLAW (July 8, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2014/07/2drone-pilots-arrested-for-allegedly-endangering-nypd-helicopter.html; Andrew
Holleran, Someone Got Struck By A Drone Outside Bryant-Denny Stadium
Saturday Afternoon, COLLEGE SPUN (Nov. 19, 2014, 3:48 PM),
http://collegespun.com/sec/alabama-sec/someone-got-struck-by-a-droneoutside-bryant-denny-stadium-saturday-afternoon; Jim Hoffer, Exclusive:
Brooklyn Man Arrested For Flying Drone Over Manhattan, ABC 7 (Oct. 18,
2013, 2:54 PM), http://7online.com/archive/9292217/; New Yorker arrested for
flying drone over US Open, RT QUESTION MORE (Sept. 5, 2014, 8:24 PM),
http://rt.com/usa/185480-new-york-tennis-drone/ (news reports of drone flights
resulting in charges of reckless endangerment).
245
14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2015) (prohibiting careless or reckless operation).
246
FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment accompanying section 333
Exemption No. 11310 (Colin Hinkle), docket no. FAA-2014-0608 at page 1
(Apr. 9, 2015)
247
FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment accompanying section 333
exemption No. Exemption No. 11310 (Colin Hinkle), docket no. FAA-2014-0608
at page 6 (Apr. 9, 2015) (“Should the proposed operation conflict with any state
law or local ordinance, or require permission of local authorities or property
owners, it is the responsibility of the operator to resolve the matter. This COA
does not authorize flight within Special Use airspace without approval from the
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But the fact that the exemption and COA do not “waive” state
law or local ordinance does not mean that any particular state law
or local ordinance is valid under the Commerce Clause or federal
preemption analysis. If the FAA approves specific drone
operations through the Section 333 process, preemption analysis
says that a state cannot block the operations unless pursuant to a
traditional police power not singling out aviation.
It is unlikely that states have the power to enforce Federal
Aviation Requirements (“FARs”) directly. States have no inherent
power to enforce federal law.248 As a general matter, judicial
enforcement of FARs is reserved to the Secretary of Transportation
and the Attorney General.249 State courts remain open to adjudicate
claims of invasion of privacy, trespass to land, and negligence so
long as the elements of each tort applied in a particular drone case
do not conflict with FAA rules.
For example, a jury instruction in a privacy case that tells the
jury it may find the defendant liable only if it finds intent to intrude
into private activities in a manner that a reasonable person would
find offensive,250 would protect the privacy litigation from
scheduling agency. The operator is hereby authorized to operate the small
Unmanned Aircraft System in the National Airspace System.”).
248
Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
698, 708 (2011) (asserting that states have no inherent power to enforce federal
law); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 263–64 (1972)
(affirming dismissal of state parens patriae suit for damages under Clayton
antitrust act); Connecticut v. Health Net, Inc., 383 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
2004) (affirming dismissal of action by state to enforce ERISA; no evidence of
Congressional intent to give states enforcement standing).
249
See Bonano v. East Caribbean Airline Corp., 365 F.3d 81, 84–85 (1st Cir.
2004) (holding that Congress meant to reserve enforcement of aviation
regulations to the FAA); Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir.
1996) (interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 46108 and holding that Federal Aviation Act
does not grant private right of action to enforce FAA rules; affirming dismissal
of action by former maintenance employer challenging dismissal for failing drug
test).
250
The tort of invasion of privacy-intrusion upon seclusion is defined as “One
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive
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preemption. The FAA does not address the intent to intrude
element, just like it did not address the design of airstairs in
Martin.251 Conversely, a jury instruction in a negligence case that
defines the standard of care as flying no lower than 1000 feet
above private property, or testimony allowing a jury to find the
same thing, would result in preemption.
As aviation matured through the twentieth century, landowners
periodically sued aircraft operators for trespass and nuisance.252
Most of the trespass cases confronted questions about how high
above the ground the property owner’s rights extend.253 Above that
height, trespass liability is preempted by FAA regulation. As for
manned aircraft, machodrone flight is unlikely to engender
difficulty with height questions. This question of the vertical extent
of property is less prominent for microdrone operations. A
landowner’s exclusive rights surely extend to 500 or 1,000 feet
above the ground, as a handful of older aviation cases hold.254 As
Part III.C.7 suggests, treetop or utility-line level is a good rule of
thumb for the upper limit of property rights.
States or municipal legislation or rules that target drones are
more likely to be preempted than a statute or regulation of general
effect, such as relating to noise, taxation, or environmental
protection. Similarly, state legislation and regulation that specifies
limits on flight profiles, crew qualifications, or aircraft design is
to a reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (Am. Law
Inst. 1977).
251
See supra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.
252
See, e.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir.
1936) (rejecting trespass liability for aircraft overflying private property).
253
Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (holding that
military flights at eighty-three feet over plaintiff’s property constituted a
compensable “taking” because it encroached on plaintiff’s property rights), with
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (holding that high-altitude flight creating
sonic booms did not constitute a trespass); see also Pueblo of Sandia ex rel.
Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting trespass action
against aircraft operator because no proof of actual injury to concrete uses of
land). “The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as
[he] can occupy or use in connection with the land.” Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
254
See supra Part III.C.7.
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more likely to be preempted than initiatives that address matters
not directly related to flight, such as business financial reserves,
employee vacation or sick leave, minimum wages, or employment
discrimination. French, Montalvo, and O’Donnell illustrate state
regulation that intrudes too far into definition of flight crew duties,
a matter regulated by the FAA. Conversely, Skysign is an example
of permitted general state regulation of advertising, and Goodspeed
Airport is an example of permitted state environmental regulation.
If an existing or proposed FAA rule exists on a particular
subject addressed by state legislation and regulation, it is more
likely to be preempted. Montalvo and O’Donnell are examples.255
But if the FAA has left a gap in its regulations on the particular
subject, state action to fill the gap is less likely to be preempted,
even if the FAA regulates the general area. The regulation of
airstairs in Martin is an example. Under the distinction it draws,
requiring state or local registration of drones already registered
with the FAA is not permissible, because it conflicts with the
federal registration regime.
Moreover, preemption is less likely if a state narrowly targets a
particular highly localized area of drone operations, and relates it
to matters of traditional state concern, such as personal privacy, or
security of property occupancy. Deference usually given to matters
of traditional state concern, and the argument is stronger that the
activity is outside the Commerce Clause.
If a state incorporates Federal regulatory standards into its tort
law256 and provides its own remedies when a plaintiff can prove
violation of the standards, proximate causation, and injury,
preemption is unlikely. Cleveland illustrates this point,257 although
the case goes further in allowing state regulation. Abdullah
supports the proposition,258 and the other products liability cases
discussed in Part III.C embrace the distinction.
255

See supra Part III.C (analyzing cases).
The common-law doctrine of negligence per se is an example of such
incorporation.
257
See supra Part III.C (analyzing cases).
258
Id.
256
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The case law validating state regulation of airport siting259
supports the proposition that states and municipalities have the
power to specify where drones may take off and land, effectively
limiting where microdrones may fly, given their short range. States
and municipalities may not, however, regulate the height at which
drones can be flown. Because the FAA prescribes a maximum
height above ground level, justified by reducing interference
between drones and higher flying manned aircraft, these
requirements would be preempted. On the other hand, a state or
local rule establishing a minimum height is less likely to be
preempted because there is no FAA-established minimum height,
and because of traditional police power to regulate land use. The
cases involving claims of trespass to land by aircraft might suggest
otherwise, however.260
Limiting the purposes for which drones may be flown, for
example, prohibiting flights for surveillance or to capture imagery
of a particular individual, might be permissible. The FARs, while
imposing different airman and aircraft certification and different
flight rules for different purposes such as banner towing, medevac, and tourism in certain areas do this because of differing types
of safety threats. A state or local law limiting purposes would be
aimed instead at exercising traditional police power over privacy
or land use. To the contrary is a recent student note,261 which
concludes that state and municipal laws focused on drone safety,
such as measures limiting flight altitudes or flights over populated
areas, are likely to be preempted.262
Conversely, state and local regulation of surveillance, justified
by protection of personal privacy, may survive preemption
challenges, at least if they apply the same limitations to manned
aircraft as to drones.263 States should be able to regulate data
collection, to limit liability for accidents, and to require liability
259

See supra Part III.C.5.
See supra Part III.C.7 and accompanying text.
261
Ray Carver, State Drone Laws: A Legitimate Answer to State Concerns or
a Violation of Federal Sovereignty, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (2015).
262
Id. at 404.
263
Id. at 404–05.
260
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insurance, because there is no federal aviation law on these
subjects, and because of traditional—and statutory264—state
prerogatives over insurance.
The airport regulation preemption decisions suggest that states
and municipalities have more non-preempted power over facilities
they own and manage than over facilities in private hands. States
and municipalities likely have more authority to regulate drone
conduct in public spaces than they do over private property,
especially over public parks. States and municipalities already
regulate access to public parks, charge fees, and determine what
activities are permissible. Prohibiting drone flight without permit is
a relatively simple matter to accomplish, as the Chicago Park
District Commission initially proposed.
The distinction between sovereign and proprietary
governmental functions was enshrined in Supreme Court case law
for a while with respect to the reach of federal labor law into local
government employment.265 The distinction has largely been
abandoned as a touchstone of labor law preemption, but
conceptually, it remains viable as a federalism principal,
contrasting, for example, local regulation of a private airport from
governmental operation of an airport.
B. Model aircraft and Consumer Drones
States have broader authority to regulate hobbyist flight of
model aircraft and consumer drones compared with commercial
drone operations, because the FAA has been active only with
respect to commercial drone operations. Section 336 of the 2012
Act266 prohibits the FAA from promulgating any rule or regulation
applicable to model aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds, as long
as they are flown consistent with “community-based” guidelines,
264

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2015) (saving state insurance regulation from
federal preemption).
265
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,
541–43 (1985) (discussing unworkability of proprietary/governmental function
distinction).
266
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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as a part of “community based programming,” and not near
airports. The reference to community-based guidelines is generally
understood to mean guidelines issued by the Academy of Model
Aeronautics.267 The reference to “programming” probably means as
a part of a local model aircraft club-sponsored outing.268
The Conference Report on the 2012 Act explains:
In this section the term “nationwide community-based organization” is
intended to mean a membership based association that represents the
aeromodeling community within the United States; provides its
members a comprehensive set of safety guidelines that underscores safe
aeromodeling operations within the National Airspace System and the
protection and safety of the general public on the ground; develops and
maintains mutually supportive programming with educational
institutions, government entities and other aviation associations; and
acts as a liaison with government agencies as an advocate for its
members.269

Section 336 also says nothing about state or local regulations,
and its withholding of authority for the FAA leaves a relatively
clear field for states to regulate model aircraft operations.
The safe harbor for model aircraft is written around traditional
practices of well-organized and long-established model aircraft
hobbyist organizations such as the Academy of Model
Aeronautics. In a traditional model aircraft club, Radio-Controlled
(“RC”) hobbyists get together at designated fields as a group and
cooperatively fly their aircraft, usually with one person serving as
the pilot, and the second serving as an observer. Adherence to safe
practices depends on the culture of a particular group and the
dynamics of interaction on a particular day. All clubs have rules,270
however, both general and specific for operations for any particular
field, and the club members generally follow them, exerting social
pressure on anyone who deviates. On a visit to an RC hobbyist
267

ACADEMY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, http://www.modelaircraft.org/ (last
visited Sept. 25, 2015).
268
This is the author’s opinion.
269
H.R. Rep. No. 112-381, at 199 (2012) (Conf. Rep.).
270
See Academy of Model Aeronautics National Model Aircraft Safety Code,
ACADEMY
OF
MODEL
AERONAUTICS
(Jan.
1,
2014),
https://www.modelaircraft.org/files/105.pdf.
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field, one encounters hobbyists with their RC airplanes flying them
in pairs, talking and joking about their planes and past exploits.271
They all know each other. It unlikely that one of them would stray
too far from the norm and risk getting kicked out of the club.
If a club member becomes interested in drones, and buys a DJI
Phantom or 3DR Solo, he is likely to fly it according to the rules,
unless he decides to try to make money with it. Then, the pathway
of the section 333 exemption process and the eventual final rule for
sUAS are available. His habit of compliance with RC club rules
and his general awareness of the FAA probably will cause him to
comply rather than just to ignore the restrictions on commercial
microdrone flight.
Hence, the operation of drones by organized RC hobbyists does
not pose significant new threat to other aircraft or to the citizenry
in general. Hobbyists have a good safety record, and commercial
microdrone operators are unlikely to put their exemptions and
certificates at risk by flouting the FAA’s detail rules for
commercial operations —whatever their eventual content.
The new threat comes from a different quarter: from the
thousands of people who got microdrones as Christmas or birthday
presents, but have no prior connection with an RC model club or
any prior interest in tinkering with model aircraft.272 Based on the
more-than 1,600 section 333 exemptions that have been granted
and the much larger number of pending petitions, some the users
are entrepreneurs, especially photographers, freelance journalist,
civil engineers, surveyors. The vast majority of these casual
purchasers, however, do not plan on starting a business or making
arrangements to fly their drones as a part of an RC club activity.
Instead, they take their drones out into their backyards, local parks,
and nearby school grounds and fly for fun. When they go to a
sporting event, a music festival, a vacation location, or some other
271

Based on personal observations by co-author Perritt during a July 2015
visit to the Blue Max RC Club Flying Field, Buffalo Grove, IL.
272
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. and Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385, 407–18 (2015) (explaining lack of
community-based adherence to rules by casual drone users).
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recreational gathering, they will think about taking their drone for
the same reason they take their cameras: to get some good imagery
for their Facebook pages and to record videos for YouTube.
Indeed, recent events have confirmed this new threat. The
drone that landed on the White House lawn273 was not being flown
for commercial purposes; it was flown for fun in connection with
an alcohol-fueled party. Likewise, the incident in King County
Washington274 involved recreational, rather than commercial, drone
flight.
Arguably, these consumer operations fall outside the statutory
safe harbor for RC hobbyists anyway. Such operations are not
“operated in accordance with a community based set of safety
guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide
community-based organization.”275
Enough ambiguity exists in the language to support broad
claims that the Congress has placed all forms of consumer drone
activity beyond the FAA’s reach. The statute may be amended, of
course, as S.1608 proposes to do. But any proposed amendment is
likely to face ferocious opposition from the RC hobbyist
community276 and therefore passage of such an amendment is
uncertain. Even if S.1608 becomes law, or if the FAA decides to
impose automation performance requirements on microdrones as a
prerequisite for sale,277 anarchy will be the norm for consumer
drones unless states and municipalities supplement FAA
enforcement resources. If states and municipalities decide to step
273

Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, White House Drone Crash
Described as a U.S. Worker’s Drunken Lark, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/white-house-drone.html?_r=0.
274
Graham Johnson, FAA investigating drone flying near news helicopters,
KIROTV (March 17, 2015), http://www.kirotv.com/news/news/faa-investigatingdrone-flying-near-news-helicopte/nkYk7/ (reporting on near miss between drone
and news helicopters).
275
2012 Act § 336(a)(2).
276
Nearly half of the comments filed on the NPRM were from hobbyists
opposing FAA regulation of model aircraft.
277
Its current authority to do so is uncertain. Compare statutory language for
motor vehicle regulation and electronic device regulation with FAA’s authority.
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in, the preemption barriers are modest. States have a long history
of regulating recreational activity that may pose safety problems:
hunting, archery, recreational boating, and all-terrain vehicles.278
Requiring consumer drones to fly at low altitude, stay within line
of sight of the operator, not to fly over people, and only to fly in
public parks with a permit is not likely to interfere with
commercial microdrone operations or to interfere with the
operation of the National Airspace System.279
State and local regulation of consumer drones will have little
adverse effect on the economics of commercial drone operation,
because they are not being flown commercially—if the consumer
drone regulations exclude commercial microdrone operations
conducted under FAA rules and approvals.280 Limiting state and
local regulation to risk-based and performance-oriented rules is a
good idea anyway, but even if they are not so limited, the adverse
effect on commercial designs may be limited because of a growing
differentiation between consumer designs and even low-end
commercial designs.281
The matters outlined in Part IV.A that are off-limits to state and
local regulations of commercial drone activity are permissible
subjects for state and local regulation of recreational drone activity.
If states exercise that authority, they can be significant contributors
to public safety and other legitimate state interests.

278

This puts states in a strong position under the first criterion set forth in Part
IV.C.1.
279
This puts states in a strong position under the second criterion set forth in
Part IV.C.2.
280
This puts states in a strong position under the third criterion set forth in
Part IV.C.3.
281
This puts states in a strong position under the fourth criterion set forth in
Part IV.C.4.
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C. State and Local Initiatives
Only a handful of states have enacted statutes limiting the
operation of drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or “UAVs”).282
Most of these laws prevent law enforcement use of drones for
evidence gathering without appropriate search warrants. Some of
these limitations prohibit law enforcement and citizens from
weaponizing drones. Some heighten privacy protection by
prohibiting aerial surveillance without consent. A few statutes limit
drone involvement in hunting. The table on pages 59 through 62
lists the statutes and is followed by a discussion of specific
statutory provisions and an evaluation of the likelihood of federal
preemption.
State

Citation

Approved /
Effective

Summary

Fla.

C.S.C.S.S.S.B 766
Freedom from
Unwarranted
Surveillance Act

Approved:
Prohibits law enforcement use to
May 14, 2015 gather evidence; prohibits
recording an image of a privately
owned property or of the owner
(tenant, occupant, invitee etc.)
violating a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
Exceptions: police use with a
warrant, “performance of
reasonable tasks” within the
scope of one’s license, property
appraisals, utility inspection,
mapping, delivering cargo (if
FAA compliant).

Idaho

IC 21-213

Approved:
Apr. 11, 2013
Effective:
July 13, 2013

282

No law enforcement searches
without a warrant; no aerial
photography without prior
consent.

Specifically, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have passed laws.
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Summary

Ill.

720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/48-3
Freedom from Drone
Surveillance Act

Prohibits law enforcement use
of drones without a warrant;
no drone interference with
hunters

Ind.

IC 35-33-5-9

Approved:
July 1, 2014

Iowa

HF 2289

Approved:
No drones for traffic law
May 23, 2014 enforcement; evidence obtained
without warrant is inadmissible.

Md.

SB 370

Approved:
Only the state can make drone
May 12, 2015 laws (preempts counties and
Effective:
local ordinances).
July 1, 2015

Miss.

SB 2022

Approved:
Defines felonious trespass to
Apr. 23, 2015 include peeping through a
window, hole, or opening with a
drone; prohibits photographs and
video of people without consent

Mont.

HB 330

Approved:
No weaponized or armored
Apr. 23, 2015 drones for law enforcement
Effective:
Oct. 1, 2015

Nev.

AB 236

No law enforcement use without
a warrant

No person shall weaponize a
drone or operate a weaponized
drone; no operation within 500ft
or 250ft vertically from a critical
facility and 5 miles from airport
without consent; right of action
(trespass) if drone is less than
250ft over property and property
owner notifies DROP that the
flight is unauthorized; no use for
law enforcement to collect
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evidence. Creates a public
registry of all state operated
drones.
N.H.

SB 222 Fish and
Game—Animal—
Harassment

Approved:
May 7, 2015
Effective:
Jan. 1, 2016

No activity that disturbs animals
with intent to prevent their
lawful taking; no drone use with
intent to conduct video
surveillance of citizen lawfully
hunting, finishing, or trapping,
without prior consent.

N.D.

HB 1328

Approved:
Evidence obtained by a drone
Apr. 15, 2015 not admissible as evidence
without a search warrant; law
enforcement cannot use drone
footage as a basis for probable
cause; no lethal weapons on a
drone. Does not prohibit drone
usage for research and
development by educational
institution.

Or.

HB 2534 Fish and
Game—Fish and
Wildlife Comm’n—
Drone Regulation
HB 2354: only
definition of drone
changed to
“unmanned aircraft
system”

Approved:
Prohibits use of drones related to
May 12, 2015 pursuit of wildlife (angling,
hunting, trapping) or aiding
through use of drones to harass,
track, locate, or scout wildlife,
and interfere with angling,
hunting, and trapping. The
definition of drone includes
unmanned water-based vehicles.

Tenn.

HB 153 Crimes and
Offenses—
Drones—
Photography and
Pictures

Approved:
Apr. 20, 2015
Effective:
July 1, 2015

No operation over events with
100+ attendees for a ticketed
event; no flight around
fireworks without event
organizer’s consent.
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Tex.

423.008

Law enforcement must submit a
report of drone use to the
governor.

Utah

HB 296

Approved:
Evidence obtained by a drone
Mar. 27, 2015 not admissible as evidence
without a search warrant.

W.
Va.

HB 2515 Wildlife—
Animals—Weapons

Approved:
Apr. 2, 2015

Wis.

WSA 941.292
WSA 175.55

Approved:
No weaponized drones; no law
Apr. 10, 2014 enforcement use without a
warrant.

Prohibits hunting with drone.

1.

Law Enforcement
The drone statutes reinforce the constitutional limitation on
unreasonable searches and seizures. This prevents law enforcement
from taking advantage of a new technology to conduct warrantless
searches.
Some states prohibit law enforcement from gathering evidence
without a search warrant. In Illinois, law enforcement “may not use
a drone to gather information”283 unless it obtains a search warrant
prior to the search.284 Law enforcement agents may use drones in
certain circumstances like crime scene and traffic investigation.285
Wisconsin and Indiana, like Illinois, prohibit the use of drones to
gather evidence without a search warrant.286 Violation results in
283

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 167/10 (West 2014).
Id. § 167/15 (2).
285
Id. § 167/15 (5) (confines law enforcement drone operation to the
geographic location and imposes a time limit on investigation).
286
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-9
(West 2014). See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
21-213 (West 2013), IOWA CODE ANN. § 808.15 (West 2014); 2015 Nev. Stat.
ch. 327, 2015 N.D. Laws ch. 239 (H.B. 1328) (prohibiting drone use to gather
evidence without a search warrant).
284
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inadmissibility of the evidence. In addition, North Dakota prohibits
use of drone imagery to establish probable cause to obtain a search
warrant that would lead to drone captured evidence.287
Some states prohibit—or propose to prohibit—law
enforcement from weaponizing a drone.288 In addition to
weaponizing a drone, Wisconsin prohibits law enforcement from
equipping a drone with armor.289 Other states extend this
prohibition to civilian drone operations.290
Texas addresses concerns about law enforcement abuse but not
limiting drone use. The Texas statute does not explicitly require a
search warrant when law enforcement conducts an aerial search to
gather evidence using a drone.291 It merely requires that the law
enforcement agency must, every two years, submit a written report
to the governor, the governor lieutenant, and each member of the
state legislature with a list of drone missions, costs of operating
and maintaining a drone, and a list of non-criminal drone
investigations.292
2.

Privacy
States with drone privacy statutes address the fear of citizens
using drones as “prying eyes” to collect information about their
neighbors from an aerial vantage point. The statutes prohibit aerial
imagery capture without consent.293 Florida, for example, prohibits
any surveillance of a privately owned property, its owner, and
anyone legally occupying the premise (landlord, tenant, or
licensee).294 The Idaho statute prohibits capturing imagery of land
and occupants without prior consent of the owner or the
287

2015 N.D. Laws ch. 239 (establishing limitations on the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles for surveillance).
288
2015 Montana Laws ch. 261.
289
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55 (West 2014).
290
2015 N.D. Laws ch. 239 (H.B. 1328) (establishing limitations on the use
of unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance).
291
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 423.008 (West 2013).
292
Id.
293
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21213 (West 2013).
294
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015).
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occupant.295 Additionally, some states legitimately use drones over
property for property appraisals, utility inspections, and mapping,
if the DROP performs the “reasonable task” under a state
occupational license.296
Flying a drone over private property without consent can lead
to a trespass claim against the DROP or a penalty. Some states
allow a trespass claim after the landowner notifies the DROP about
an unauthorized flight over the landowner’s land lower than 250
feet.297 Texas, for example, creates a civil right of action against a
violating DROP and allows a landowner to recover a penalty for
every captured image or for distributing images.298 In Mississippi, a
drone trespass is a “felonious trespass” when a DROP uses a drone
to peep through a “window, hole, or opening.”299 For drone
operation during live events, Tennessee prohibits unauthorized use
with more than 100 guests attending a ticketed event.300
3.

Hunting
Aside from privacy concerns, some states worry about the role
of drones in the outdoors. States have enacted bills concerning
hunting, fishing, and trapping. New Hampshire prohibits drone use
with the intent to prevent lawful taking by hunters.301 Oregon, for
example, prohibits drone use to interfere with hunting, trapping,
and fishing.302 State statutes also prohibit drone use to aid in
hunting. It is illegal to track, locate, and scout for wild animals303

295

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West 2013).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2015).
297
2015 Nev. Stat. ch. 327 (regulating operators of unmanned aerial vehicles
in Nevada).
298
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.006 (West 2013).
299
2015 Miss. Laws ch. 489 (prohibiting “peeping tom” activities that do not
amount to felonious trespass).
300
2015 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 240 (prohibiting unmanned aerial vehicles from
capturing images at an event with more than 100 people).
301
2015 N.H. Laws ch. 38 (amending current animal harassment laws to
include drone usage).
302
2015 Or. Laws ch. 61 (prohibiting the use of drones in pursuit of wildlife).
303
Id.
296
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and to herd animals with a drone to hunt.304 Drone wildlife statutes
prevent DROPs from interfering with others’ enjoyment of wildlife
sports and from taking advantage of a drone to gain an upper hand
in outdoor sport. The measures restricting what state or local law
enforcement may do with drones are not preempted because of the
traditionally strong state interest305 in regulating its own law
enforcement bodies and the limited effect on air commerce.
Likewise, the measures related to hunting are not preempted
because of the traditional state interest306 in that subject.
The Tennessee, Florida, Idaho, and Mississippi statutes present
more interesting preemption questions, because they restrict the
operations of civilian drones outside the hunting context.
Tennessee’s prohibition of flying over major events can be
justified by the state’s interest in public safety. Limitations on what
people can do in connection with large public events are a
traditional mainstay of state and local regulation.307 The Tennessee
crowd overflight prohibition is congruent with the section 333
exemption and (probable) eventual final-rule prohibition on flying
over crowds. Tennessee could further justify its involvement as
simply providing additional enforcement mechanisms for a
federally established standard, similar to what happens when state
law provides remedies for conduct that violates federal standard.
On the other hand, a state crowd overflight restriction that goes
well beyond the federal standard is more vulnerable to a
preemption challenge.
The prohibition against aerial imagery over property without
the owner’s consent and of human subjects without their consent
can be justified as an extension of traditional state measures to
protect private property and personal privacy interests.308 These
304

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (West) 2015).
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
306
Id.
307
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (upholding,
against First Amendment challenge, city regulation of noise emanating from
concerts).
308
See supra note 100, and accompanying text (explaining deference to
traditional state interests).
305

DEC. 2015]

Preemption of State Drone Regulation

371

matters are generally left to the states and covered by extensive
state regulation already. Many states already prohibit capturing or
publishing images of persons without their consent.309 State
overflight rules on this subject, however, are more vulnerable to
preemption challenges when they extend the height below which
permission is required. A limit of 250 feet places half of the FAA’s
allowable height under off-limits, especially if it is accompanied
by restrictions or overflight of public spaces. Such inconsistent
height limits interfere with the federal regulatory regime and
burden air commerce.
These state privacy measures would fare better under
preemption analysis if they simply extended existing state
limitations on photographing individuals. Such measures do not
single out drones or other aircraft for special restrictions. The case
law is more hospitable to state regulation of general application.
D. Space for Municipalities?
Whether municipalities may regulate drones depends on
whether the states of which they are a part may, and on how state
law defines the relationship between the state and its subdivisions.
The sovereignties in the United States’ constitutional structure
are the federal government and the states, not municipalities.310 The
states met at the Constitutional Convention and ceded some of
their sovereign power to the United States; counties, towns, and
cities were not at the table.311

309

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2015) (prohibiting commercial use of
another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness without permission);
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/30 (West 1999) (prohibiting commercial use
of a person’s identity). The statute defines “identity” as “any attribute of an
individual that serves to identify that individual to an ordinary, reasonable
viewer or listener, including but not limited to (i) name, (ii) signature, (iii)
photograph, (iv) image, (v) likeness, or (vi) voice.” Id. at 1075/5.
310
Indian tribes also are sovereign, but their role in drone regulation is beyond
the scope of this article.
311
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 584–86 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (characterizing federalism under U.S. Constitution).
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States started out with more sovereignty than they have now.
They gave away some sovereignty—part of it upward to the
national sovereign, and part of it downward to counties, cities, and
towns. Counties and other municipalities enjoy only such powers
as are granted by the sovereign state.312 The Civil War established
that states, having ratified the United States Constitution, are not
entitled to take back any of the sovereignty they ceded to the
federal government.313 The states, in contrast, may take back the
sovereignty they ceded downward to local units of government at
any time. For example, a 2015 Maryland statute preempts
municipal drone regulation.314
Of course, if that state’s local government prerogatives are
codified in that state’s constitution, the process for taking it back
may be more arduous than simply passing a bill in one session of
the Legislature.315 In some states, local government enjoys only
those governmental authorities explicitly granted to them by state
statute or constitutional provision, as was the case in Alabama for
many years.316 The trend, however, is for states to adopt home rule
legislation that grants general governmental power to
312

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 674 (1978) (explaining
that municipalities derive all their powers from the state).
313
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 740 (1868) (noting that the Civil War
rejected Texas’s sovereign right to secede). Secession is the complete recapture
of sovereignty. Thus by rejecting secession, the Union’s victory in the Civil War
impliedly rejected the power of a state to withdraw the cession of sovereignty to
the federal government in the constitution.
314
MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 14-301 (West 2015) (“Only the State may
enact a law or take any other action to prohibit, restrict, or regulate the testing or
operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the State. (C) Subsection (b) of this
section: (1) preempts the authority of a county or municipality to prohibit,
restrict, or regulate the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft systems; and
(2) supersedes any existing law or ordinance of a county or municipality that
prohibits, restricts, or regulates the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft
systems.”).
315
City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 858 A.2d 75, 83 (Pa. 2004) (contrasting
municipal home rule powers derived from state constitution with those derived
from state statute).
316
Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1127 n.64 (2007)
(characterizing Alabama’s lack of meaningful home rule).

DEC. 2015]

Preemption of State Drone Regulation

373

municipalities, roughly equivalent to that exercised by the state,
unless a specific power is withheld in the home rule statute or by
subsequent legislation.317
V.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES
Deciding what powers states and municipalities have to
regulate drones does not exhaust the subject. Regulation arises, not
only from economics, law, and good ideas, but also from politics
and passion.
A. Economics
Two distinct markets exist for commercial microdrone
activities. The first is the market for the vehicles themselves, and
the second is the market for services provided by operators of
those vehicles. The market for the vehicles is undeniably national
and international in character. The dominant vendor for small
drones in the United States is DJI, a Chinese company.318 United
States vendors such as 3Drobotics,319 like their foreign
counterparts, seek footholds in international markets. Allowing
states to set different standards for vehicles would significantly
interfere with the efficient functioning of these markets, and it
would be even worse if regulations are made at the local level. It
would be bad enough to need 50 different business plans and

317

See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255,
2277–2322 (2003) (analyzing history and competing philosophies of home rule);
City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. 2002) (describing
home rule authority).
318
See Ryan Mac, Heng Shao & Frank Bi, Bow To Your Billionaire Drone
Overlord: Frank Wang’s Quest To Put DJI Robots Into The Sky, FORBES (May
6, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2015/05/06/djidrones-frank-wang-china-billionaire/ (providing profile of DJI and its
competitive position).
319
See Chris Anderson, How I Accidentally Kickstarted the Domestic Drone
Boom, WIRED MAGAZINE (Jun. 22, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/
06/ff_drones/ (providing profile of 3D Robotics by founder).
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vehicle requirements, let alone 36,000 for municipalities.320 Of
course, drone manufacturers and operators could use a “common
denominator” model and adapt to the most stringent regulatory
requirements in all their models, but that would increase costs.
In contrast, the market for drone services is inherently local.
The limited range of the available vehicles means that any
particular mission is going to take place in a relatively small area.
For example, an Amazon delivery drone could only deliver
packages within the range of the battery flight time limitations.
Thus, Amazon could only serve the market immediately adjacent
to its warehouse and distribution offices. Even so, there are broader
impacts. Depending on the altitudes at which they are flown, these
local missions could pose collision risks to interstate and
international airline and commercial operations.
Also, economies of scale for marketing, finance, and
operations management may lead commercial drone operators over
time to expand, so they offer the same or similar services in more
than one geographic area. One crew dispatcher for DROPs can
handle more than one customer’s callouts. Promotional materials
prepared for one local market can be made suitable for others.
Investment promotion, cash management, accounting, purchasing,
and liability insurance all represent fixed costs that can be shared
among different local markets.
The enterprise structure of the commercial helicopter industry
is an analogy to how commercial drone operations will be
structured; the markets and missions are, in many respects, similar.
National or regional operations instead of purely local ones
predominate for oil and gas exploration crew transportation, for
medevac, for electronic newsgathering, and for much utility
infrastructure inspection. To be sure, there are many purely local
operators in each of these industry sectors, but they provide
services mostly at the margins of their customers’ operations and
of their own, flying an occasional utility patrol or event shot
320

Lists & Structures of Government, CENSUS.ORG, https://www.census.gov/
govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2015) (noting
number of sub-county municipalities in the United States).

DEC. 2015]

Preemption of State Drone Regulation

375

opportunistically in to fill out a portfolio of that offers flights for
almost any purpose, frequently coupled with flight training as the
mainstay business.
Drone operator organizational structure also will depend, to
some extent, on the organizational structure of the customers for
drone services. An enterprise with a national or international
footprint is likely to want to standardize drone services contracts
across its geographically dispersed operations. It can do this, of
course, while still allowing local decision-makers to contract with
local operators, but the economies of scale from both buyers and
sellers of drone services will push things toward arrangements of
wider scope.
Different operating rules in different parts of the country would
be impediments to realizing these efficiencies. Even if compliance
is not a problem—for example not flying over 200 feet in New
York State, but up to 500 feet in Colorado; or being allowed to fly
the drone from a moving vehicle in Nebraska but not in
Michigan—finding out what the rules are if they vary from place
to place would impose significant additional transaction costs for
legal research and advice.
B. Politics
Politics will share the stage with law and economics in
determining how regulatory power over drones will be allocated
among the federal government, states, and municipalities.
Microdrones will produce a clash over federalism when constituent
or interest group pressures to draft drone legislation prove
irresistible. Two different political issues exist: the politics of the
content of state or local drone regulation, and the politics of
federalism and federal preemption. Section IV.B discusses the
politics of content. This section addresses the politics of
federalism.
The politics of federalism intersects with judicial appreciation
of the need to give greater room for state regulation of federal
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interests in areas where states traditionally have exercised power.321
Most state and local lawmakers do not think much about
preemption. Even if they are lawyers and recall the concept from
law school and the bar exam, they are unlikely to have an
appreciation of the analysis conducted in part III and its
conclusion. Lawmakers, however, likely have a general
understanding that some matters are mostly federal and some are
mostly local.
When lawmakers think of the subject as aviation regulation,
they are likely to assume that it is a matter for the federal
government. When the subject is zoning, other land-use
regulations, nuisance, protection of personal privacy, and localized
disorderly conduct, they assume it’s a matter for state or local
regulation. Consider the following hypothetical: a state legislature
or a city council has proposed legislation on its agenda, sponsored
by one of its members in response to constituent pressure. The
content of the measure may restrict drones, or it may encourage
their expanded use, depending on local politics.
The Maryland statute322 clearly is an example of the latter, but
most of the others on the list in Part IV.C are examples of the
former. The legislative body schedules hearings, and at some point,
a hearing witness, another legislator, or staff counsel suggests that
the measure might be preempted by federal law. That will surely
come as a surprise. “You mean the federal government excludes us
from aviation regulations all the way down to one centimeter over
my backyard?” someone may ask. Then the battle is on—the FAA
is extremely unlikely to accede to the proposition that it has
anything less than exclusive authority all the way to the ground.
1.

Not in My Backyard
Ultimately, as Part V explains, the boundary between federal
and state regulation will be defined not by abstract legal principles,
but by policy decisions made by federal, state, and local
legislators. Their policy decisions will, of course, be informed by
321
322

See supra Part III.
See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
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politics operating at their particular level of government. An axiom
of political science is that concentrated interests trump diffuse
interests. Socially desirable projects such as cell phone towers,
wind turbine farms, waste disposal sites, and electricity
infrastructure “often succumb to a political process that yields to
concentrated costs over diffuse benefits.”323 Organization matters
and it is not easy to organize.324
Regulation at the federal level favors well-organized national
interests, most of whom are likely to be pro-drone: farmers,325 the
press and media,326 realtors,327 electricity and gas utilities,328
insurers,329 airlines,330 pilots,331 and railroads.332 It will be easier for
323

Barak D. Richman & Christopher Boerner, A Transaction Cost
Economizing Approach to Regulation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and
Improving Regulatory Responses, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 29, 37 (2006) (explaining
political economy of NIMBY); Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss?
Imperfect information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 917, 930–31 (1990) (summarizing literature on the greater political
power of concentrated interests opposing diffuse interests); Michael A. Fitts,
The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of
the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1580–81 (1988) (summarizing
theory of how concentrated interests bias legislative decision-making);
324
See Lucas R. White, Untangling the Circuit Splits Regarding Cell Tower
Siting Policy and 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7): When is a Denial of One Effectively a
Prohibition on All?, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1981, 1987–88 (2013) (analyzing
collective action problems in cell phone tower siting decisions).
325
See Political Power of the Agribusiness & Crop Insurance Lobbies,
TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE (October 2012), http://www.taxpayer.net/
images/uploads/downloads/Political_Power_of_Farm_And_Crop_Insurance_Lo
bbies_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
326
Commercial TV and radio stations spent $31.7 million on lobbying in 2014
alone. Commercial TV & Radio Stations, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/induscode.php?id=C2100&year=2014 (last
visited Sept. 26, 2015).
327
The real estate industry spent $1.2 billion on lobbying from 1998 to 2015.
Top Industries, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/top.php?indexType=i&showYear=a (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
328
Electric utilities spent $2 billion on lobbying from 1998-2015. Id.
329
See Health Care: A huge win for the insurance lobby, THE ECONOMIST,
(Apr. 3, 2013, 5:01 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ democracyinamerica/
2013/04/health-care (referring to “the immense power wielded by health
insurers”. The insurance industry was the second ranked industry, after
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drone manufacturers to exert political power at the national level
rather than having to develop a presence at the state and municipal
level.
Does a role for states and municipalities mean more restrictions
on desirable drone use because of the not-in-my-backyard
phenomenon?333 Answering that question requires analysis of the
political dynamics of local political decision-making, and that
involves assessment of whether pro-drone or anti-drone interests
are likely to be concentrated or diffuse.
Yale political science professor Robert Dahl, in his classic
1961 book, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American
City, highlighted the role of local governmental institutions as
mediators among conflicting interests groups, some of which had
more power to influence the process than others. Dahl said that a
political issue “can hardly be said to exist unless and until it
commands the attention of a significant segment of the political
stratum [the small segment of the population that is involved

pharmaceuticals and health products in lobbying expenditures from 1998 to
2015. Top Industries, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 327.
330
The air transport industry spent $1.1 billion on lobbying from 1998 to
2015. Id.
331
Airline pilot unions spent more than $2 million on lobbying in 2014. Air
transport
unions,
CENTER
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POLITICS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/induscode.php?id=LT100&year=2014.
332
Railroads spent $ 34.3 million on lobbying in 2014. Railroads, CENTER
FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ indusclient.php?
id=M04&year=2014.
333
“NIMBY, describes the situation where local citizens, organized
community groups, and officials who want to benefit from an ‘essential
infrastructure,’ such as wireless telecommunication facilities, but do not want
the infrastructure located in their particular neighborhoods and communities.”
Camille Rorer, Recent Development, Can You See Me Now? The Struggle
between Cellular Towers and NIMBY, 19 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 213,
216–17 (2004–05); See Hannah Wiseman, Expending Regional Renewal
Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 483–84 (2011) (arguing that
fragmentation of governmental authority prevents efficient land use for
renewable energy; proposing regional structures).

DEC. 2015]

Preemption of State Drone Regulation

379

regularly in politics].”334 An issue may take root because members
of the political stratum get interested in it and influence other
members to pay attention. It also may take root when the apolitical
stratum experiences a vaguely felt need, and members of the
political stratum formulate ways for the need to be addressed by
political institutions.335 The vicissitudes of press and media
attention drive awareness in both strata. A highly publicized drone
accident, or a rescue of a lost child enabled by drone imagery
would have this impact.
One cannot predict political behavior in a particular unit of
government without sophisticated public opinion polling of the
population of that particular unit. Even then, predictions based on
poll results are notoriously unreliable when political opinion is
rapidly changing or when a particular issue is not very firmly in the
public consciousness.336 Still, national polling suggests that the
public attitude toward drones is unfavorable,337 likely fueled by a
perception that civilian drones resemble military drones used in
combat by the armed services and intelligence agencies—Predators
and Reapers with thousands of pounds flying out of sight, at
thousands of feet above the ground, and loitering for many hours to
spy on or launch missiles at those below.
Over time, the wider use of civilian microdrones will alter the
public perception, but for now, the likelihood is great that negative
public attitude, reinforced by the not-in-my-backyard phenomenon,
will make state and local legislative bodies instinctively hostile to
widespread use of microdrones.
334

Robert Alan Dahl, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY 92 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining crystallization of political issues).
335
Id.
336
See Everett Carll Ladd, A word on the limitations of polling, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, (May 20, 1988), http://www.csmonitor.com/1988/
0520/epoll-.html (summarizing limitations of political polls).
337
Alwyn Scott, Americans OK with police drones - private ownership, not so
much: Poll, REUTERS, (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/
02/05/us-usa-drones-poll-idUSKBN0L91EE20150205 (reporting that 42% of
2,000 respondents opposed private ownership and operation of drones, but 62%
support police use for crime fighting).
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Public concern about drones has been intensified by the FAA’s
misleading public characterization of a database of drone sightings
by manned aircraft pilots. In several press releases, the agency has
characterized these reports as representing near-collisions between
drones and helicopters or airplanes. The data show no such thing.
A careful analysis by the Academy of Model Aeronautics shows
that the database mostly reports mere drone sightings. In only one
percent of the reports, did the pilot take evasive action, the routine
maneuver to avoid a mid-air collision. Many of the reports were
vague about what the pilot saw. In one case the pilot reported what
“looked like a flying dog.”338
For example, in May 2015, the Commissioners of the Chicago
Park District considered a measure to prohibit drones from flying
in Chicago’s extensive public parks without a permit.339 No
mechanism for obtaining a permit existed. The initial measure was
withdrawn from the agenda pending reconsideration at another
meeting after model aircraft enthusiasts protested. Subsequently,
counsel for the Park District carefully reviewed the law of federal
preemption and crafted a more nuanced proposal, which is
expected to be considered later in 2015.
The City of Chicago has adopted an ordinance that represents a
model for other municipalities.340 The ordinance exempts section
333 exemption holders but subjects other operations to limitations
similar to imposed by the FAA on commercial operations and by
the AMA on hobbyists. It appropriately focuses local regulatory
energies on the two problem areas: casual users ignorant of
338

See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Report: FAA exaggerates drone ‘close calls’,
RTDNA NEWSLETTER (Sep. 23, 2015 1:30 PM), http://www.rtdna.org/article/
report_faa_exaggerates_drone_close_calls; A Closer Look at the FAA’s Drone
Data, ACADEMY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, http://www.modelaircraft.org/gov/
docs/AMAAnalysis-Closer-Look-at-FAA-Drone-Data_091415.pdf.
339
Board of Commissioners 5/13/2015 Meeting, CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT,
https://chicagoparkdistrict.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2283879&G
UID=C26DC8E7-CAA4-44B1-A9ED-E275409C6D92.
340
Amendment of Municipal Code Title 9 by adding new Chapter 9-121 to
regulate use of small unmanned aircraft in City airspace, SO2015-5419
(approved by Aviation Committee, Nov. 12, 2015; enacted by City Council,
Nov. 18, 2015).
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aviation safety regulation, and commercial operators who flout
federal regulation. It allows local law enforcement to enforce
federal rules by incorporating them into local law. The initial
version would have banned all drone operations within the city
limits unless the vehicles were registered with the city and the
owner could prove insurance coverage. The version actually
adopted eliminates the registration and insurance requirements.341
In some communities, drone proponents will be well organized
and influential, as they were in Chicago. Realtors,342 construction
firms, and utilities, are alert and have drones high enough on their
agendas that they are willing to make the effort. In some rural
communities, agricultural interests that want to use drones will be
influential. In most cases, however, it is more likely that
concentrated opposition will trump diffuse supporters who do not
know about the initiative or who do not want to go to the trouble of
opposing it.
2.

Intellectual Capital
Eighty years ago, Justice Brandeis famously observed that the
genius of the federal structure of the United States is that states can
serve as laboratories within which different regulatory approaches
can be tried out.343 Moreover, having different local regulations has
341

The authors of this article worked with the City Council and drone interest
groups to revise the proposal before it came to a vote. Both testified in favor of
the revised ordinance. Most of the testimony by other witnesses was favorable to
drones, as well.
342
Realtors are well represented on zoning bodies. Accordingly their interest
in using drones to market listed properties is concentrated relative to that of
neighbors who may oppose drone operations for this purpose. But see Jerry L.
Anderson & Erin Sass, Is the Wheel Unbalanced? A Study of Bias on Zoning
Boards, 36 URB. LAW. 447 (2004) (reporting on survey of members of Iowa
zoning boards, data from which mostly refuted hypothesis of pro-development
bias).
343
“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment.” New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (invalidating,
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its merits. For example, each region has its own environmental
characteristics (weather and terrain) that rational drone rules
should take into account. The conditions for drone operations and
the risks they pose are different in rural and urban environments.
The agenda of the state laboratories, however, is not
determined by an intellectual exploration of facts and the public
interest. It is determined by politics, and politics translates into
policy only when intellectual capital links amorphous public desire
to concrete legislative or regulatory language.344
Drone regulation is unlike occupational safety and health345 and
employment discrimination.346 In those areas, many states had
mature effective programs before the national program was
crafted. Drone regulation is completely different. Virtually all of
the intellectual capital with respect to drone regulation has been
developed under the premise that drones would be regulated
nationally.
As a result, few states or municipalities have given any serious
thought to how drones should be regulated. Few interest groups
have focused on drafting desirable state and local regulations. Most
of the bills proposed have been impulsive, superficial, and
motivated by ill-conceived public perceptions of the realities of
drone flight. On a relatively new issue like drones, local decisionmakers are buffeted by public outcries animated by urban myth
and overblown anecdotes about what might happen. Local decision
makers go with the flow, as they lack firm intellectual or political
anchors to resist or to shape public opinion. Overblown public
response to new technologies is not unprecedented, however. The
early days of the automobile set off a regulatory overreaction. For
as violating substantive due process, state law restricting entry into ice
business).
344
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case
of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1506–07 (2005) (explaining
that groups at the margins of society may lack the necessary social and
intellectual capital to influence events; qualities that elites possess in
abundance).
345
See supra Part VI.A.
346
See supra Part VI.A.
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example, a New York City cab driver was arrested and jailed for
driving his electric taxi at the “breakneck speed” of 12 miles-perhour, and a Connecticut legislator introduced a bill to require
drivers to come to a complete stop to avoid frightening horses.347
State and local legislators are not irresponsible; they just lack
resources to determine the facts. Interest groups provide essential
technical support and intellectual capital to higher-level legislative
bodies and forge long-standing relationships involving trust with
the ample committee and personal staffs that support Congress.
Interest groups frequently are impotent at lower levels of
government, because they lack the resources to interact effectively
with legislators, who often are part time, and have little, if any,
staff support.
VI.
FUTURE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Uninhibited drone regulation at the state and, especially, at the
local level will result in dramatically different regulatory regimes
across the country, often the product of ill-informed local hysteria.
The result would stifle innovation and realization of the benefits of
new technologies. It also would bear little relationship to actual
risks and their mitigation.
Federal preemption of aviation safety regulation is motivated in
large part by the need to prevent such evils. In addition to
encouraging safety of air commerce, the FAA Administrator has a
statutory duty to “encourage the development of civil
aeronautics.”348 It is thus appropriate for the FAA not only to
assure that state and local regulation does not interfere with its
safety mandate, but also to assure that state and local regulations
347

Randy Alfred, May 21, 1901: Connecticut Sets First Speed Limit at 12
MPH, WIRED (May 21, 2008,), http://archive.wired.com/science/discoveries/
news/2008/05/dayintech_0521.
348
49 U.S.C. § 40104 (2012); see also 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(3) (2012)
(“[FAA Administrator shall consider] encouraging and developing civil
aeronautics, including new aviation technology”); 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (c)(2)
(2012) (“[FAA Administrator shall consider] the public right of freedom of
transit through the navigable airspace”).
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does not stifle innovation and the development of commercial
drone markets.
In considerable measure, the motivation for this article’s
proposal is to give the FAA and Congress a way to respond to state
and local political pressure to allow states and municipalities to
regulate drones. Adoption of the proposal is far better for air
commerce, the national airspace system, and local democracy than
a shoving match among different levels of government, inevitably
resulting in an outbreak of uncoordinated litigation in state and
federal court.
A. Mechanisms for Federal-State Cooperation
Cooperative federal-state regulation is not uncommon.
Mechanisms for sharing federal and state authority over the same
subject matter are pillars of air pollution regulation, occupational
safety and health regulation, and remedying employment
discrimination.
For example, the Clean Air Act distributes responsibility for
setting and enforcing air-pollution standards among the federal
EPA and state and local governments.349 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 requires the complaints of employment
discrimination be filed first with state anti-discrimination agencies,
if they exist, before the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has jurisdiction.350 Congress, in crafting the
federal Occupational and Safety Act, was reluctant to federalize
workplace safety. Accordingly, it provided for a system of state
implementation plans under federal Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) oversight.351
349

Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation
Plans—Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209,
211–12 (2004) (explaining allocation of federal, state, and local authority in
state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act).
350
See Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1213–16 (1971) (criticizing deferral-state
procedure).
351
See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 570 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(remanding OSHA regulations on staffing and funding of state implementation
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B. Default: Federal Regulation and Preemption
Default regulation for drones would comprise FAA regulations
for DROP qualification, vehicle capabilities, and operating rules. A
petition process would accommodate state and local governments
who desire to play a role. A state or municipality (authorized by
state law) could petition the FAA to regulate drones in certain
airspace. The FAA would be required to grant the petition, so long
as it meets the following interrelated criteria, to be considered
collectively:
1. It must show that the proposed state regulation involves
matters traditionally of concern to the states;
2. It must show that the proposed state regulation does not
interfere with effective operation of the national airspace system,
including drone integration into it;
3. It must not interfere with the economies of scale necessary
to allow drone commerce to develop in an unfettered market;
4. It must impose performance rather than technical
engineering standards.
In effect, the regulatory regime would be an inversion of the
state of affairs in mid-2015, when the default is a prohibition, and
commercial operators must petition to fly. Under the proposal, the
default would be permission to fly with units of state and local
government empowered to petition to limit it. This arrangement
could be authorized by statute, or it could be implemented under
existing statutory authority. The FAA already has authority to
decide when to regulate and when to stay its hand, and it also has
authority to delegate its regulatory responsibility to others.352 For
plans); Courtney M. Malveaux, OSHA Enforcement of the “As Effective As”
Standard for State Plans: Serving Process or People?, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 323,
324–25 (2011) (explaining that Occupational Safety and Health Act allows
states to adopt their own implementation plans so long as they are at least as
effective as federal standards).
352
See 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d) (2012) ([authorizing FAA Administrator to
delegate] “examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate
under this chapter”); 14 C.F.R. § 183.1 (summarizing delegation of authority for
issuing airman, operating, and aircraft certificates).
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the most part, delegation now involves shifting authority to private
persons, but there is no reason that the authority to delegate
explodes delegation to state and local governmental authorities.353
Moreover, the FAA frequently exercises the authority to leave
certain areas within the scope of its statutory authority
unregulated.354 Model aircraft operations were an obvious example
before the 2012 statute withdrew FAA authority over the subject.355
Commercial airline aircraft airstairs are another example, to
borrow from case law.356 In effect, under the proposal, the FAA
would delegate its authority to particular states in the space and to
the extent that that the state proposes. It would withhold its
authority to impose its own rules in that space and to that extent.
The concept could be implemented in the final rule for
microdrones. It was not disclosed in the proposed rule, however,
and therefore it has not received the public comment the
Administrative Procedure Act envisions.357 If the rule is deferred,
the federal government will have a considerable head start in
regulating microdrones—exactly the opposite of the experience
with occupational safety and health and employment
discrimination regulation. That is not necessarily negative, as the
initial increment of federal regulation could produce data about
and what does and does not work, where state supplementation of
the regulatory framework is most desirable.
The default position of federal regulation, while leaving the
initiative to states and municipalities to pose exactly what they
want to regulate, is that Congress, or the FAA, need not make
guesses as to what is well suited for state and local regulation and
what will satisfy state and local desires. If a state want to exclude
drones from certain areas of geography, it can propose to do so.
353

See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP
Discipline: Training and Testing Operators of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 143, 158–61 (2015) (analyzing FAA
authority to delegate).
354
See supra Part III.C.
355
See supra Part IV.B.
356
See supra Part III.C.
357
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
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C. FAA Authority to Approve a State Plan
This section discusses some legal justification that would allow
state or local rules to coexist with federal law on drones.
1.

Unusual Local Interest
The first possibility would build on the Commerce Clause
doctrine and federal-preemption analysis that allows states a wider
ambit of regulatory authority alongside, or instead of, the federal
government in areas traditionally within the state police power:
land-use regulations, personal privacy, and other areas of common
law torts. A state petition that imposes insurance requirements, or
tort rules for imposing liability arising from drone accidents, would
be viewed favorably under this criterion. A petition that addresses
traffic separation, DROP qualification, or vehicle standard would
not.
2.

Non-Interference with the National Airspace System (NAS)
The second consideration involves assessing the state proposal
in terms of its effect on the efficient and safe operation of the
national airspace system. A state proposal to exclude drones from
the airspace below treetop and powerline level over private
property without permission would be viewed favorably under this
criterion because it would have little effect on national airspace
system operations and on most legitimate drone flight; indeed it is
not clear that anyone is permitted to fly a manned aircraft or a
drone below treetop and powerline level about private property
under existing if FARs, under the NPRM, or under the Section 333
exemptions.
On the other hand, a blanket ban on drones over the entire
territory of a municipality would interfere with the efficient and
safe operation of the national airspace system, given that Congress
has declared that commercial drone operations are a part of the
national airspace system, subject only to compliance with FAA
rules to ensure safe integration.
3.

No Adverse Effect on Economies of Scale
The third criterion would require a showing by the state that its
rules can be accommodated without commercial drone operators
having to have separate business plans and operating programs for
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each local area in the United States. It also could be heightened by
showing that a state or local government proposes to adopt uniform
or model rules proposed by an entity like the Uniform
Commissioners on National State Laws, the National Association
of Attorneys General, or some other private group. Satisfaction of
this criterion also would exist if a petitioner shows that compliance
with the rules impinges only slightly on likely commercial drone
operations. Restricting low-level flight over backyards is an
example of where impingement is low. Exposing certain purposes
such as harassment to after-the-fact liability would be another
example.
On the other hand, a state or municipal regulatory regime that
limits the kinds of vehicles that can be flown would be suspect
under this criterion. It would have the effect of requiring drone
operators with more than a local footprint to select their fleets to
accommodate a patchwork quilt of potentially inconsistent vehicle
requirements. Local imposition of DROP and other crew member
qualification requirements would be suspect for the same reason.
Any system that requires advance approval of drone flight would
be inconsistent with this criterion because it would increase the
transaction costs to know what the advance approval requirements
are and to alter operations to comply with them. Advance approval
for specific flights would be considerably worse in this regard than
blanket approval for flights during a defined period of time, such
as a year.
4.

Plausible Risk Basis and Performance Orientation
The fourth criterion is related to the first. The risks that a
petitioner identifies should be explicitly and logically linked to the
interests cited under the first criterion. The analysis would
resemble that used in the Fourteenth Amendment due process
analysis to demonstrate a nexus between limitations on human
activity and legitimate state interests.358

358

See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (summarizing rational basis test).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The availability of small inexpensive drones has resulted in
thousands of people flying them for fun and for business. Farmers,
electric utilities, pipeline companies, photographers, moviemakers,
television producers, public-safety organizations, and television
stations are regularly using them to collect aerial imagery when
helicopters and airplanes are too expensive or cannot be flown
safely. Despite the obvious utility of drones, casual users have
alarmed the public and the traditional aviation community, who
fear injury to people on the ground, invasion of personal privacy,
and midair collisions with other aircraft.
Aviation safety has been understood for more than 50 years to
be a matter exclusively reserved for regulation by the federal
government. The FAA has been slow to develop a regulatory
framework, but now it has begun that process in earnest, approving
more than 1,500 specific commercial operations, and publishing a
46-page proposed rule in the Federal Register.
Meanwhile, state statutes and local ordinances are breaking out
all over the country. While many of these are preempted by federal
law, not all of them are. A careful and well-informed effort by state
and local legislative bodies to understand the risk and appreciate
the particular role that states can play to supplement federal
regulation can improve public safety without strangling this
revolutionary new aviation technology in its cradle.
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